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SUMMARY
This dissertation attempts to contribute to extant discussions on how one
utilizes knowledge for economic gain. In order to understand how one can bene-
fit from exploiting knowledge, scholars have examined the innovation process. The
mainstream view of innovation is that it is a process of knowledge recombination.
Consistent with this view, two related issues are whether there is sufficient stock of
knowledge to recombine, and what mechanisms there are for knowledge recombina-
tion. This dissertation addresses these issues in three essays. The first essay, titled
‘Technology Transfer and the Sources of Research Funding: Implications for the Na-
ture of Research’, addresses the former issue. The second essay, titled ‘Academic
Scientists: Their Nature of Research and Entrepreneurial Actions’, and the third
essay, titled ‘Team Formations in Technology Ventures’ undertake the latter issue.
The first essay is a response to the controversies in the growing interaction between
the realm of science and the realm of commercialization. One of the controversies is
whether the interactions divert academic scientists research agenda toward industry
interests at the expense of fundamental science. This essay considers how an academic
scientist chooses the level of difficulty of a research project and its level of relevance to
industry interests. The direct cost of doing science is incorporated into the scientists
decision. A simple game-theoretic model between research sponsors, a government
agency and a firm, and an academic scientist is constructed. The model shows that
the funding decisions of research sponsors are strategic substitutes. It also shows that
the academic scientists choices of project characteristics are strategic complements.
The model proposes situations in which an academic scientist pursues challenging
projects that are relevant to the firms interests. It also proposes situations in which
x
an academic scientist decides on projects that are less challenging and less relevant
to the firms interests.
The second essay provides insights on scientific entrepreneurs. While science-
based entrepreneurship has become an increasingly important source of innovation,
understanding of who these scientific entrepreneurs are is limited. Therefore, this es-
say examines which academic scientists will be more likely to create new technology
ventures. It is argued that the nature of scientists research, specifically the level of
its commercial applicability, is an important predictor of entrepreneurial actions of
academic scientists. Using data from 395 academic scientists at five top US research
universities, it is observed that there is a non-linear relationship between the nature
of research and entrepreneurial actions. An inverted-u shape relationship between
the level of commercial applicability and the likelihood that academic scientists will
create new ventures is found in the field of non-life science. In the field of life sci-
ence, a decreasing relationship between the level of commercial applicability and the
likelihood that academic scientist will create new ventures is observed. These results
support the view that scientific human capital is heterogeneous in converting scientific
result into commercial outcomes.
The third essay offers insights on entrepreneurial teams. Despite the prevalence of
entrepreneurial teams, insights on individual entrepreneurs are more available than
understanding on entrepreneurial teams. This essay investigates mechanisms that
give rise to entrepreneurial teams. A simple model is constructed. The model shows
that an entrepreneur obtains less expected value from a project if the entrepreneur
chooses to work solo at latter stage than working in a team. The effects of economic
value, probability of failure, and cooperation cost on the timing of team formation
are presented. It is also explained how asymmetry of importance between tasks in
a commercialization project influences the decision of team formation and its opti-
mal size. An extended model is constructed to analyze two benefits of team work:
xi
specialization and diversity. This model proposes that greater probability of failure
does not necessarily increase propensity to form entrepreneurial teams. The situa-




OVERALL RESEARCH GOAL AND IMPLICATIONS
It is widely recognized that utilization of knowledge enables economic gain (Dasgupta
and David, 1994; Mokyr, 2004). It is also acknowledged that utilizing knowledge
remains an intricate issue. The intricate issues that persist are the incentive to create
knowledge and to apply existing knowledge into commercial applications. It is argued
that, if knowledge creation activities were entrusted to the market mechanism, a
society will be deprived of knowledge, particularly fundamental knowledge (Nelson,
1959), and underinvest in innovation activities (Arrow, 1962).
In order to understand how one can benefit from exploiting knowledge, scholars
have examined the innovation process. Schumpeter (1934) explained that innova-
tion is a process of recombination of existing knowledge. Therefore, availability of
knowledge pool that provides building blocks for new knowledge and the ability to
combine available knowledge are essential. Consistent with this view, extant litera-
ture addresses two issues. First, studies investigate whether there is sufficient stock of
knowledge to exploit (e.g., Nelson, 1959; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Mokyr, 2004;
Murray and O’Mahoney, 2007; Thursby, Thursby, and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2007). Sec-
ond, given the nature of knowledge, researchers seek to understand mechanisms that
allow utilization of available knowledge for economic gain (e.g., Kline and Ronsen-
berg, 1986; Von Hippel, 1994; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer,
1998; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002).
This dissertation attempts to contribute to extant discussions on how one can uti-
lize knowledge for economic gain. Its second chapter aims to contribute to the issue
of whether there is sufficient knowledge stock to exploit. Scientific system has been
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an important provider of knowledge stock. However, different type of research has
distinct influence on the knowledge pool. Fundamental research is deemed to have
larger impact to the knowledge pool than applied research (Nelson, 1959). That is,
fundamental research results in knowledge that is building blocks for larger number of
potential new knowledge than applied research does. Hence, chapter two investigates
how academic scientists choose their research agenda (i.e., the type of research). The
third and fourth chapters aim to add to discussions on mechanisms of utilizing knowl-
edge for economic advancement. The chapters specifically focus on new technology
ventures as the mechanism of exploitation. The third chapter investigates conditions
under which academic scientists decide on founding new technology ventures to com-
mercialize scientific research. The fourth chapter analyzes conditions under which
entrepreneurs create teams in their attempt to commercialize inventions.
Figure 1: Overarching research framework
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1.1 Scientific system and its interaction with commercial
system
While it is accepted that science plays an important role in technological progress
and economic growth, the implications of the growing interaction between the realm
of science and commercialization remain controversial (Nelson, 2004). The heart of
the controversy is as follows. The workings of scientific system involve distinctive
norms that are essential to the production of knowledge, such as the rule for prior-
ity and communalism1. Interaction with the commercial realm exposes the scientific
system to the norms associated with commercialization, including the primacy of pri-
vate knowledge and to pecuniary rewards. Because these norms are contradictory to
those of the scientific system (Dasgupta and David, 1994), the issue arises of whether
such interaction is detrimental to the scientific system, especially in its function as
the knowledge producer for society (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Siegel, Wright, and
Lockett, 2007).
Scholars have examined this issue from several angles. The first angle is that
because economic rents depend on one’s capacity to keep information private, the
growing involvement of academic scientists in commercial activity will hamper the
process of generating knowledge and, hence, long-term economic growth. The ar-
gument is that exclusion delays or prevents scientist access to, or use of, existing
knowledge, which is an important component of potential new knowledge (e.g., Blu-
menthal et al, 1996; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Murray and Stern, 2007; Walsh,
Cohen, and Cho, 2007; Thursby and Thursby, 2008; Hong and Walsh, 2009). The
second angle is that commercialization activities may divert academic scientists’ at-
tention from their main mission of teaching and research. Two outcomes of diversion
1Stephan (1996) and Dasgupta and David (1994) provide insightful details regarding how the
reward system in science, the priority of discovery and the winner-takes all, encourages knowledge
creation and disclosure.
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that have emerged as major concerns are effects on research output and research ori-
entation. However, previous studies have not found evidence that commercialization
activities result in a decline in research output. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) find
no relationship between patenting activities and publication output among academic
scientists in the Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Engineering departments at
MIT. Moreover, empirical studies have shown that a complementary relationship ex-
ists between commercialization and research output2 (e.g., Fabrizio and Di Minin,
2008; Buenstorf, 2009). Related evidence based on patenting and disclosure activities
indicates that the greater involvement of academic scientists in commercialization is
driven by higher research output (e.g., Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart, 2007; Thursby and
Thursby, 2009a). Regarding the effects of commercialization on research orientation,
it is concerned that academic scientists pursue research projects that have commer-
cial applications at the expense of basic research (Vavakova, 1998; Pogayo-Theotoky,
Beath, and Siegel, 2002; Campbell et al., 2005; Geuna and Nesta, 2006).
Chapter 2 shares with existing studies examining the diversion of academic sci-
entists’ attention. The focus of the discussion will be on research orientation rather
than research output. The search for evidence of whether basic research is neglected
in favor of applied research and of why this might occur is especially complicated
because it is possible to pursue research problems that are both basic and applied
(Stokes, 1997). Stokes argues that in such situations, known as Pasteur’s Quadrant,
applied research is also fundamental in nature. Empirical studies intended to detect
changes in research orientation present mixed results (Cohen et al., 1998). However,
these studies have not indicated that basic research is being neglected. Some em-
pirical studies demonstrate that academic scientists adapt their research to applied
2Fabrizio and Di Minin (2008) find that academic patenting correlates positively with the publi-
cation output. Using licensing and spin-off activities as measures of commercial activities, Buenstorf
(2009) observes a similar pattern between commercialization and research output.
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science and to commercially useful problems3 (e.g., Rahm, 1994; Van Looy et al.,
2004; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart, 2009). Other stud-
ies find no evidence of such a change4 (e.g., Ranga, Debackere, and Von Tunzelmann,
2003; Van Looy, Callaert, and Debackere, 2006; Thursby and Thursby, 2007; Thursby
and Thursby, 2009b).
In general, empirical and theoretical studies of research orientation involve five
positions. The first position is that the prospect of commercial profit encourages
academic scientists to pursue research projects that have commercial applications
regardless of the projects’ contribution to fundamental knowledge (Krimsky et al.,
1996; Hane, 1999; Campbell et al., 2005). The second position is that academic
3In a survey to the top 100 US research universities, Rahm (1994) uncovers that 41% of academic
scientists express the fear of negative impact of technology transfer activities on the basic research
orientation of their universities. The 59% of academic scientists in their sample do not perceive such
interference. Their survey also reveals that 24% of university administrators fear the interference
while 76% of the university administrators do not. Van Looy et al. (2004) use division memberships
as the measures of entrepreneurial involvement. Comparing academic scientists who are members of
divisions and those who do not, they find that the former group published more papers in applied-
oriented journals than the later. However, both groups’ publications in basic-oriented journals are
comparable. In a survey on academic scientists at Norway universities, Gulbrandsen and Smeby
(2005) observe that about 50% academic scientists funded by industry characterize their research as
applied. About 40% of the academic scientists funded by industry characterize their research as basic.
In comparison, they find that approximately 62% of academic scientists funded by non-industry
(other external fund) characterize their research as basic and approximately 25% of them identify
their research as applied. Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart (2009) constructed a sample of 3,862 academic
scientists in life science. On these academic scientists, they find patenting activities positively
correlate with commercial content of research publications. Their result is robust on three measures
of commercial content: the ”patentability” of research publications, the co-authorship with industry
affiliated researchers and the Journal Commercial Score (i.e., the proportion of industry affiliated
authors publishing in a journal).
4Observing publications from year 1985 to 2000 of academic scientists in KU Leuven, Ranga,
Debackere, and Von Tunzelmann (2003) find a small dominance of publications in basic-oriented
journals to publications in applied-oriented journals. Comparing academic scientists who involved
in patenting and those who did not, Van Looy, Callaert, and Debackere (2006) show that the former
group published more papers in basic oriented-journals than the later. Using a dataset of academic
scientists in six major US universities over a seventeen-year period, Thursby and Thursby (2007)
find that there has been no change in the proportion of research published in basic-oriented journals
to research published in applied-oriented journals. Based on a sample from 11 major universities
in the US, Thursby and Thursby (2009b) use disclosures as the measures of academic scientists’
involvement in licensing. They observe that academic scientists who disclosed have a higher number
of publications in basic-oriented journals than academic scientists who never disclose. Their findings
also show that both the number of publications in basic-oriented journals and in applied-oriented
journals increase with disclosure activities. The increase of the number of publications is greater for
academic scientists who disclosed than those who did not.
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scientists spend more time on basic research and applied research because both types
of research contribute to the stock of knowledge from which they produce licensable
output (Thursby, Thursby, and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2007). In the presence of licensing,
Thursby, Thursby and Gupta-Mukherjee show that academic scientists are able to
increase the time that they spend on basic research and applied research because they
reduce their leisure time regardless of the Pasteur Quadrant. The third position is that
when academic scientists consider undertaking commercializable research projects,
there exists a trade-off between the ease of commercialization by the reduction in
commercialization costs and the ease of performing research by avoiding disutility
from performing applicable research (Lacetera, 2009). It is argued that academic
scientists select applied research over basic research if the former is larger than the
latter.
The fourth position is that the decisions of academic scientists regarding the type
of research arise from their aspirations to undertake research projects (Goldfarb,
2008). Because applied sponsors constitute an alternative source of research funding,
it is argued that academic scientists favor applied research over basic research if such
a decision allows them to actualize the aspirations. A related line of argument is that
industry funding is not impartial (Eisenberg, 1988; Benner and Sandstorm, 2000;
Geuna, 2001; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005) although it enables academic scientists
to recruit additional researchers, graduate students and post-doctoral scientists, ac-
cess the equipment in industrial laboratories or access research materials (Campbell
et al., 2005; Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart, 2009). The fifth position is rooted in the
awareness that the benefits that academic scientists can derive from applied research
include both financial rewards and the satisfaction of having a wider impact on so-
ciety (Sauermann, Cohen, and Stephan, 2010). It is argued that financial incentives
may not be the main reason why scientists choose to engage in applied research. It is
possible that academic scientists choose applied research over basic research in spite
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of limited financial incentives if their desire to have a broad impact on society is
sufficiently high.
Investigating the impact of commercialization on academic scientists’ research
orientation, extant studies consider the opportunity cost of forgoing research. Op-
portunity cost is usually depicted as involving non-pecuniary benefits such as the sat-
isfaction of working on research puzzle, scientific reputation, or social impact (Levin
and Stephan, 1991; Sauermann, Cohen, and Stephan, 2010). After one acknowledges
the relevant opportunity cost, the existing studies on research orientation, except-
ing those that employ the fourth approach, have assumed that actualizing scientific
freedom in academia is free. The non-pecuniary benefits of research are indeed essen-
tial building blocks of the scientific system (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Dasgupta and
David, 1994). However, such abstraction away from the direct cost of doing science
calls for comments as Stephan (1996) explains that funding is necessary for academic
scientists to conduct their chosen research projects. Consistent with Stephan’s ex-
planation, Walsh, Cohen, and Cho (2007) find that access to funding is the fourth
most popular reason why biomedical scientists in academia select particular research
projects, ranking below only to scientific importance, interest, and feasibility. The
survey also reveals that the main reason why these scientists do not pursue certain
research projects is a lack of funding.
When funding is available from applied sponsors, their influence on academic sci-
entists’ research projects is worthy of attention (Eisenberg, 1988; Geuna, 2001; Gul-
brandsen and Smeby, 2005). For example, in a survey of medical literature, Bhandri
et al. (2004) find that research funded by industry sponsors is more likely to pro-
duce results that are favorable to the industry. Another example is the controversial
agreement between University of California at Berkeley and Novartis in 1998. Based
on a five-year research agreement, the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology
at University of California at Berkeley received $25 million of funding from Novartis
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(Rosset and Moore, 1998). The benefits that Novartis received in return included
two out of the five seats on the department’s research committee, which gave the
firm the authority to decide how the research budget would be disbursed (Press and
Washburn, 2000). Nevertheless, academic scientists are not passive victims of applied
research sponsors. That academic scientists exploit funding from applied sponsors is
suggested in a survey of 62 major US universities conducted by Thursby, Jensen,
and Thursby (2001). When asked how they measured the success of the technology
transfer offices at their universities, 75% of academic scientists responded that spon-
sored research is an extremely important measure of success (Thursby, Jensen, and
Thursby, 2001; Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby, 2003).
The approach taken in Chapter 2 builds on the literature that points out the rela-
tionship between research funding and academic scientists’ decision regarding research
problems (i.e., fourth approach). The essay in Chapter 2 contributes to the litera-
ture in four ways. First, it complements Thursby, Thursby, and Gupta-Mukherjee
(2007) and Gans and Murray (2010) in providing theoretical foundation of academic
scientist’s choice of research agenda when commercial profit is plausible. The differ-
ence between the essay and Thursby, Thursby, Gupta-Mukherjee (2007) is that the
chapter considers the influence of funding agency on academic scientist’s decision.
The chapter differs from Gans and Murray (2010) in which this essay models an aca-
demic scientist as an active player in creating a research agenda while the Gans and
Murray (2010) models an academic scientist as a selector of research projects. The
propositions in the essay contribute to the discussion in the literature on whether aca-
demic scientists’ involvement in commercialization shifts academic research agenda
from objective issues toward issues of industry’s interest.
Second, this essay extends our understanding on the nature of scientific work as
described in Stokes’ quadrants. The essay confirms to the accepted notion that funda-
mental research does not necessarily imply separation with application (Stokes, 1997).
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Toward Stoke’s framework which depicts combinations of varying degree of fundamen-
tal research and applied research, the essay suggests that the relationship between
the two dimensions is complementary. Third, this essay brings industry characteris-
tics into the discussion of whether there is a shift academic research agenda. These
characteristics are incorporated in the level of difficulty of firm’s research problem
and the equality of firm’s scientists. Inclusion of these factors is important because
the quality of firm’s scientists affect the ability of the firm to solve its research prob-
lem, thus its interest to fund academic scientists. The magnitude of scientists who
work in the industry is not trivial. In the US, 40% of 2006 science and engineering
PhD graduates in the US took employment in the industry (Sauermann, Cohen, and
Stephan, 2008). Moreover, some industries are aggressive in recruiting competent
scientists from academia (Washburn, 2005).
1.2 New ventures as mechanisms that transform scientific
investment into commercial outcomes
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 investigate the transformation of scientific investment into
commercial outcomes through new technology ventures. Chapter 3 focuses on new
technology ventures founded on university research. In particular, Chapter 3 seeks
to explain which academic scientists are more likely to create new technology ven-
tures. Besides the magnitude of scientific investment, this question is important for
two additional reasons. First, the role of scientific human capital in transforming
scientific results into commercial outcomes cannot be underestimated. For instance,
the tendency in the biotechnology industry for locations of new technology ventures
to follow the location of prominent scientists illustrates the fact that knowledge is
embedded in individuals (Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998). In addition, reliance
on scientists for successful technological development is intensified when inventions
are in an embryonic stage (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Furthermore, Agarwal (2006)
9
has shown that engaging inventors increases the probability of commercialization suc-
cess. Second, the role of scientific human capital in transforming scientific results into
commercial outcomes is not a simple input-and-output function. For example, the
contribution of academic scientists to new technology ventures’ performance does not
increase proportionally with their scientific productivity. Rather, their contribution
to patenting productivity of the new ventures decreases as their scientific productiv-
ity increases (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2009). In a related study, Gittelman and Kogut
(2003) argued that research that highly impacts scientific knowledge does not neces-
sarily lead to valuable inventions because different selection logic operates in science
and in commercialization. This emerging literature indicates that the mechanism
through which scientific human capital contributes to commercial outcomes is not
homogenous, but rather heterogeneous. More importantly, the quality of science is
only one part of the heterogeneity. Hence, examining which academic scientists are
more likely to create new technology ventures offers a step in examining alternative
sources of heterogeneity.
While determinants of new ventures have been at the heart of entrepreneurship
literature (e.g., Gartner, 1990; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), extant studies have
treated scientists-entrepreneurs as different from general entrepreneurs. For example,
scientists engaging in commercialization activities face conflicting institutional norms
in scientific and industrial community (Dasgupta and David, 1994). In addition, sci-
entists’ reservation cost for leaving their laboratory bench is high because they derive
utility from doing science (e.g., Stephan, 1996; Stern, 2004). Furthermore, academic
scientists and industry scientists differ in their choices of the timing of commercializing
an invention (Lacetera, 2009). The extant literature explaining academic scientists’
entrepreneurship has provided valuable insights, yet the majority of studies examine
macro level explanations. Thus, a systematic study at the individual level is required
to answer the research question.
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At macro level, literature has identified the influence of environment, university,
and social influence on the creation of new ventures. Environmental factors of interest
have included venture capital funding as enactment of opportunity mechanism (e.g.,
Steffensen, Rogers, and Speakman, 2000; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Wright et al.,
2006) and intellectual property protection (Shane, 2002). Furthermore, studies have
shown that the number of new venture creations is not a direct function of the amount
of a university’s research expenditure (i.e. research resource), but that it is also a
function of the university’s specific type of resources. These specific resources include
the university’s expenditure on technology transfer activities, industry funding on
research expenditure, and the quality of scientific human capital (e.g., Di Gregorio
and Shane, 2003; Lockett andWright, 2005; O’Shea et al., 2005). Finally, studies show
that social influence reduces the cost of being an academic entrepreneur by providing
resources such as advice on whom to contact and how to work with Technology
Transfer Offices. Such studies also show that an entrepreneurial social environment
can change a scientist’s perception of the benefits of being an academic entrepreneur
(e.g., Louis et al., 1989; Nicolau and Birley, 2003; Kenney and Goe, 2004; Krabel and
Mueller, 2009). For instance, Stuart and Ding (2006) showed that proximity to other
academic entrepreneurs increases the likelihood that a focal scientist will engage in
entrepreneurship.
At the individual level, extant studies have emphasized the role of scientific pro-
ductivity in creating new ventures (e.g., Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998). Stuart and
Ding (2006) showed that the effect of social proximity to an academic entrepreneur
increases when the focal scientist is in the proximity of an academic entrepreneur
who is also a markedly productive scientist. In a conceptual paper, Lacetera (2009)
showed that academic scientists are selective in commercializing inventions, especially
when they are dealing with particularly promising inventions. Jain, George, and Mal-
tarich (2009) proposed that academic scientists who found new ventures are those who
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can cope with conflicting roles by protecting their scientific identity and asking help
from Technology Transfer Offices. Studies also consider the influence of scientists’
prior experiences with entrepreneurship (e.g., Krabel and Mueller, 2009; Ding and
Choi, 2008). Furthermore, scientists that have been identified as productive of new
venture creation have been associated with the following characteristics: a greater
exposure to the technological source, a personal ability to perceive, understand, and
apply advanced technology, a younger age, and a sense of challenge and satisfaction
with sources (Roberts, 1991). These studies, however, provide limited explanation
on human scientific capital’s characteristics related to their role in commercialization
outcomes. In addition, while an academic scientist’s decision to create new ventures
depends upon alternative commercialization routes, such as licensing to existing firms,
extant studies rarely incorporate this alternative option5.
In Chapter 3, we seek to understand the following question: which academic
scientists are more likely to engage in founding new ventures? Our proposed answer
is that academic scientists’ decision to create new ventures is influenced by the nature
of research, specifically its level of commercial applicability. The essay in Chapter 3
contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it complements a stream of studies
that examines the role of university based ventures in technology transfer. In this
literature, the study that is closest to this essay is Lowe (2006). This essay differs
from Lowe (2006) in that Lowe focuses on the role of contract design in predicting
university based ventures. Second, this essay adds to the limited studies on the
choice of commercialization routes (e.g., licensing to established firm vs. establishing
new technology ventures). A study by Jensen and Showalter (2009) is closest to
this essay. The difference between the essay and their study is that Jensen and
Showalter (2009) concentrates on contract design and offers empirical evidence at
university level whereas this essay emphasizes scientists’ research characteristic and
5Exception includes Ding and Choi (2008) and Jensen and Showalter (2009).
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provides empirical evidence at individual level. Third, the essay contributes to the
discussion on the role of scientific human capital in bridging the realm of science and
commercialization. Consistent with extant studies (e.g., Gittleman and Kogut, 2003;
Toole and Czarnitzki, 2009), the essay show that heterogeneity of human capital
explains differential outcomes of commercializing scientific results. The essay extends
this literature by proposing that the nature of scientist’s research is another dimension
of heterogeneity of human capital.
While Chapter 3 discusses the origin of new technology ventures, Chapter 4 focuses
on commercialization process once the technology ventures are founded. Specifically,
Chapter 4 discusses team formation in new technology ventures, and attempts to
answer the following questions: why does an entrepreneur forms a team at a partic-
ular stage of a commercialization project? What are the factors that encourage or
inhibit the formation of entrepreneurial teams? These questions are important for,
at least, three reasons. First, there is an increasing occurrence of teamwork. In all
fields of science, more research is done in teams (Wutchy, Jones, and Uzzi, 2007).
In addition, the average number of inventors per patent has been steadily increasing
(Jones, 2009). In the field of entrepreneurship, 40 to 50 percent of new businesses are
formed by teams (Shane, 2008). Yet, most studies on entrepreneurship focus on indi-
vidual entrepreneur (Forbes et al., 2006), such as entrepreneur trait and entrepreneur
optimism.
Second, entrepreneurial teams have been linked to the performance of new ven-
tures. For instance, working in a team allows the accumulation of experience of the
team members, which have been found to increase the survival and sales of the new
ventures (Delmar and Shane, 2003). In addition, founding team size and its hetero-
geneity are positively associated with the growth of the new ventures (Eishenhardt
and Schoonhoven, 1990). Third, because new ventures are plagued with resource
constraint (Stinchcombe, 1965; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005a; Rothaermel and
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Thursby, 2005b), it is important to carefully allocate its resource. The optimal deci-
sion of team formation influences resource allocation by avoiding two types of risks.
One is the risk of an early team formation is carrying unnecessary cooperation cost,
hence depleting the scarce resource of the new ventures. In addition, an entrepreneur
experiences the risk from a late team formation is missing higher outcome which
comes from specialization in a team-project. It is found that an entrepreneur obtains
less expected value from a project if the entrepreneur chooses to work solo at latter
stage than working in a team. The effects of economic value, probability of failure,
and cost of cooperation on the timing of team formation are presented. We also
explain how asymmetry of importance between tasks in a commercialization project
influences the decision of team formation.
The essay in Chapter 4 contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it adds to
the dearth of literature in on entrepreneurial teams. Second, the essay broadens the
literature on team structure by elaborating the relation between the specialization and
diversity. Third, the essay extends the existing studies on the impact of uncertainty
on the propensity of working in team. It confirms to extant studies that uncertainty
increases the likelihood of team formations. The essay also suggests that the likelihood
of team formations declines when the uncertainty is sufficiently high. The conditions
in which this pattern is reversed is analyzed. Fourth, the essay complements existing
literature by evaluating how asymmetry of importance between tasks influences the
propensity of team formation.
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CHAPTER II
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE SOURCES OF
RESEARCH FUNDING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
NATURE OF RESEARCH
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the first chapter, the approach taken in Chapter 2 builds on the
literature that points out the relationship between research funding and academic
scientists’ decisions regarding research problems. This paper also builds on the work
done by Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2010), who detail the interaction between
research sponsors and academic scientists that occurs when the potential for commer-
cial profit exists. By including research funding as one of the factors that academic
scientists consider in choosing a research problem, this approach results in a model
that identifies mechanisms that link academic scientists and the nature of research
projects. Because the focus is on the type of research project undertaken, the model
abstracts from the issue of hazard in commercialization. In-depth theoretical in-
vestigations of the hazard, including considerations such as disclosure, shirking and
shelving, are discussed elsewhere (e.g., Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Jensen, Thursby,
and Thursby, 2003; and Dechenaux, Thursby, and Thursby; 2009).
The first section of the model specifies its elements. The second section addresses
the funding decisions of two research sponsors, a government agency and a firm.
Both research sponsors move simultaneously. It is shown that their decisions are
strategic substitutes. This result differs from Jensen, Thursby, Thursby (2010) that
shows sponsors’ decisions are strategic complement. The strategic substitute in this
essay arises because of the concavity of effect on productivity while the strategic
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complement in Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2010) arises because different type of
funding influences one another. It is also shown that the government agency provides
more funding and the firm reduces its funding when the academic scientist chooses
a more difficult problem. As expected, the firm allocates larger amount of funding
to the academic scientist if the scientist selects a research problem that is better
related to the firm’s interests. In such situations, the government agency reduces its
contribution to the academic scientist’s project. The total funding from both research
sponsors is larger for an academic scientist who has higher research-competence.
The academic scientist’s share of licensing does not influence the amount of fund-
ing from research sponsors. Meanwhile, the firm lessens its funding and the govern-
ment agency enlarges its funding when the licensing paid to the university increases.
In situations in which the firm confronts a more challenging problem in its own
research, the firm provides a larger amount of support to the academic scientists. De-
spite the lower funding from the government agency, the total funding of the academic
scientist is larger when the firm’s research problem increases in difficulty. In contrast,
the firm decreases its amount of funding to the academic scientist when the firm em-
ploys higher-quality scientists. Under these circumstances, the total funding of the
academic scientist declines in spite of the additional funding from the government
agency.
The third section of the model elaborates on the academic scientist’s decision with
specific reference to two characteristics of a research problem: the relevance of the
scientist’s problem to the firm’s field of interest and the difficulty of the problem.
The model shows that the scientist’s benefits from working on a challenging prob-
lem is greater when the problem is more relevant to the firm’s interest. Consistent
with Lach and Shankerman (2008), the model indicates that academic scientists do
respond to financial incentives associated with commercializing the outcome of uni-
versity research. It is demonstrated that if problem difficulty and relevance are highly
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complementary, an academic scientists select less challenging and more commercially
relevant problems when the licensing paid to the university or the academic scientists’
share of the licensing revenue increases.
When the scientists at a firm have higher research-competence, an academic scien-
tist decides on research problems that are less challenging and less commercially rele-
vant. Reverse pattern is obtained when the difficulty of the firm’s research problems
increases. Under such circumstances, an academic scientist chooses more challenging
and more commercially relevant problems. The reason is that the firm that funds aca-
demic scientist’s project incurs greater opportunity cost when it employs competent
scientists. In contrast, the firm that supports academic scientist incurs less oppor-
tunity cost when its own project is difficult to solve. Moreover, the higher-quality
academic scientists favor more challenging and more relevant research problems. The
fourth section incorporate the academic scientist’s and the university’s shares of re-
search funding. The fifth section of the model includes the direct benefit of research
grants on academic scientist’s utility. The results remain when we include shares of
research funding or the direct benefit of grants.
2.2 Environment and Payoffs
We built the environment of the model using a game with three players1: an aca-
demic scientist, a government agency, and a firm. The academic scientist decides
two characteristics of a research project: the level of difficulty, xa ∈ [0, X], and the
relevance of the research problem to the firm’s field of interest, β ∈ [0, 1). To carry
out her research project, the academic scientist requires funding , ea ≥ 0, and uses
her research-competence, qa ∈ [0, Q]. Thus, the probability of success of her research
project, pa (ea, qa, xa) ∈ [0, 1), depends upon the level of difficulty of the research
problem, the amount of research funding, and her research-competence. Because a
1The environment is an adaptation of one presented in Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2010).
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more difficult problem is harder to solve, the probability of success decreases as the
level of problem difficulty increases at an increasing rate, ∂pa
∂xa




the other hand, the probability of success increases with the quality of the scientist
at a decreasing rate because a more capable scientist has a greater chance of solving
the research problem than a less capable one, ∂pa
∂qa
> 0 and ∂
2pa
∂q2a
< 0. In addition,
research funding assists the academic scientist in searching for the solution to her
chosen research problem. The more generous the research funding, the greater the
chance of solving the problem, ∂pa
∂ea
> 0 and ∂
2pa
∂e2a
< 0. It is natural to assume that
research funding and research-competence are complements, ∂
2ps
∂ea∂qa
> 0. However, an
increase in level of difficulty of a research problem decreases the marginal contribution








In conducting a research project, the academic scientist earns wages, Wi, and im-
proves her reputation, Ri, where i ∈ {s, f}. Naturally, a successful project enhances
a scientist’s reputation more than a failed project, Rs > Rf . A more difficult research
problem has a similar effect on reputation, dR
dxa
> 0. If a project is successful, it has
the potential to be commercialized. The chance that a successful project will entice
a firm to license the academic scientist’s research output depends on the relevance
of her project to the firm’s interests, l (β) ∈ [0, 1). The less relevant the academic
scientist’s project is, the less likely it is that the firm will license the research output,
dl
dβ
> 0. The firm allocates part of the profit from commercializing academic research
to the university in the form of licensing revenue, L ≥ 0. That is, the academic
scientist secures additional income to supplement her university salary, A ≥ 0, when
a research project is successful, Ws = A + γL and Wf = A. The additional income
depends on her share of the licensing fee paid to the university, γ ∈ (0, 1).
An academic scientist’s utility from the research project is defined as the value
that she enjoys from wages and reputation, U (R,W ). She enjoys greater utility from
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more generous wages or a better reputation , ∂U
∂R
> 0 and ∂U
∂W




< 0 and ∂
2U
∂W 2
< 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that her utility
is additively separable2, U (R,W ) = f (R) + g (W ). We assume that, although the
marginal effect of reputation on utility when the project is successful is less than the
marginal effect of reputation on utility when the project fails, a more challenging
problem enhances greater additional reputation to a successful project than to a
failed project such that the difference in the reputational enhancement offset the







. Given additional research funding, the academic scientist earns greater additional
utility if the additional funding is allocated to the more challenging problem than







. In other words, the
additional expected utility from solving the more challenging problem is larger than
the opportunity cost of giving up the less challenging problem.
At the same time, an academic scientist experiences disutility from the level of rel-
evance of the project to the firm’s interests, V (β) ≥ 0. Problems that are relevant to
firms usually encompass broader disciplines, requiring more effort to solve (Lacetera,
2009). Such disutility also arises because problems are not always equally of inter-
est to firms and the scientific community, nor are they always equally of interest to
firms and the particular scientist (Goldfarb, 2008). Her disutility is increasing in its
argument and convex. The academic scientist’s expected utility is
EUa (G,Fa, xa, β) = pa (ea, qa, xa)U (Rs,Ws) + [1− pa (ea, qa, xa)]U (Rf ,Wf )− V (β)
(2.2.1)
By sponsoring a research project, G ≥ 0, the government agency obtains a bet-
ter reputation. That is, Rg > 0 only if G > 0. The government agency’s utility
2This approach is similar to the one in Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2010).
3where ∆U = U (Rs,Ws)− U (Rf ,Wf ) and ∆ ∂U∂xa =
∂U(Rs,Ws)
∂xa
− U(Rf ,Wf )∂xa .
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from the academic scientist’s project is denoted as Ug (Rgi) where i ∈ {s, f}. Like
the academic scientist, the government agency has more to gain in this regard from a
successful project than from a failed one, Rgs > Rgf . The government agency’s utility
is increasing and concave in the reputational stock. In funding the academic scien-
tist’s project, the government agency forgoes the opportunity to fund other research
projects. The opportunity cost of forgoing other research projects is denoted as V (G)
where V (G) ≥ 0. The government agency disutility increases in its argument and
convex because spending more units of funding on the academic scientist’s project
means spending fewer units on other research projects. The government agency’s
expected utility is
EUg (G,Fa, xa, β) = pa (ea, qa, xa)Ug (Rgs) + [1− pa (ea, qa, xa)]Ug (Rgf )− V (G)
(2.2.2)
The firm decides the level of funding to the academic scientist, Fa ∈ (0, F ), based
on its own research projects. It distributes a certain amount of the research budget,
F > 0, to its own research projects and an additional amount to the academic sci-
entist’s project. As with the academic scientist’s project, the probability of success
of the firm’s research project, pc (ec, qc, xc) ∈ [0, 1), is contingent on the level of dif-
ficulty of the research problem, the amount of research funding, and the quality of
the firm’s scientists. These two research projects also have differing consequences to
the firm. First, the firm naturally chooses a problem that is commercially relevant
to its business when conducting its own research. Unlike the results of the academic
scientist’s project, the results of the firm’s own project will absolutely be relevant
for commercialization. Secondly, the firm retains all profits when commercializing its
own research but shares some of the profits with the university when commercializing
academic research. Thirdly, the firm’s project only receives funding from its own
research budget, while the academic scientist’s project can have up to two sources of
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funding. We use Πu and Πc to represent the firm’s profit from the academic scientist’s
research project and the firm’s own research project. The firm’s expected profit is
EΠ(G,Fa, xa, β) = pa (ea, qa, xa) l (β) (Πu − L) + pc (ec, qc, xc)Πc − F (2.2.3)
where the level of funding on the academic scientist’s project is
ea = G+ Fa (2.2.4)
and the level of funding on the firm’s research project is
eo = F − Fa (2.2.5)
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the academic scientist de-
cides on the characteristics of the research project. In the second stage, the academic
scientist seeks funding from the government agency and the firm. The firm and the
government agency simultaneously chooses the level of funding for the academic sci-
entist. At the end of the second stage, the success or failure of the academic scientist’
project is observed.
2.3 Stage Two Equilibrium
In the second stage, the government agency and the firm choose their units of funding,
G and Fa, for the academic scientist’s research project. The interior Nash equilibrium
must satisfy
∂EUg (G





















l (β) (Πu − L)−
∂pc
∂ec
Πc − 1 (2.3.4)
A unit increase in the government funding for the academic scientist’s project
increases her total funding, thus also increasing the chances of solving the research
problem. The government agency’s expected utility then increases with the increase
in the chance of solving the problem. However, a unit increase in government funding
to the academic scientist’s project increases opportunity cost and thus is actually
associated with disutility. If the losses from diverting resources to the academic
scientist’s project are too high, the government agency will not provide the scientist
with funding. Otherwise, the government agency will increase the amount of the grant
to the academic scientist until a one-unit increase in funding results in additional
unit of expected utility equal to the amount of the added disutility. In other words,
the government agency increases the level of funding until the marginal effect of
government funding on its expected utility is offset by the marginal loss.
The firm is subjected to two conflicting forces when it increases research funding
for an academic scientist. On the one hand, it adds to the total funding for the
academic scientist, increasing the chance that the academic scientist will solve the
problem. Consequently, the firm’s expected profit from the academic scientist’s re-
search also rises. On the other hand, greater funding for an academic scientist reduces
the funding allocated to its own research project, decreasing the chance that the firm’s
scientist will find a solution. Accordingly, the firm’s expected profit from its research
also declines. If the expected loss of profit from its own research is too high, the firm
will not allocate its research budget to the academic scientist. Otherwise, the firm
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will increase the amount of funding to the academic scientist until a one-unit increase
of funding results in additional expected profit from the academic scientist’s research
that is equal to the additional loss of expected profit from the firm’s research. That is,
the firm will increase the level of funding to the academic scientist until the marginal
effect of its funding on the expected profit from the academic research is offset by the
marginal expected loss of profit from the firm’s research.
As mentioned earlier, it is possible for the academic scientist to obtain funding
from both research sponsors. Considering this likely dual source of funding, the firm
decides the amount of research funds for the academic scientist, Fa, which maximizes
EΠ(G,Fa, xa, β). The firm’s decision differs for different levels of government agency
funding. Thus, the firm’s best response function, F̂a (G), is the level of firm funding to
the academic scientist that maximizes its expected profit for any level of funding from
the government agency. The government agency also chooses the amount of the grant,
G, for the academic scientist, which maximizes EUg (G,Fa, xa, β). The agency’s deci-
sion depends on the firm’s contribution to the academic scientist’s research. The gov-
ernment agency’s best response function, Ĝ (Fa), is the level of government-provided
funding for the academic scientist that maximizes the agency’s expected utility for any
given level of firm funding. An example of research sponsors’ best response functions
and the equilibrium level of funding is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Proposition 2.3.1 When the government agency’s and the firm’s best response are
interior, Ĝ (Fa) ∈ (0, Bg) and F̂a (G) ∈ (0, F ), their best responses are negatively
sloped.
Proof. Available at the appendix
Depicted in Figure 1, the firm’s best response is a declining function of the govern-
ment agency’s funding. At the same time, the government agency’s best response is a
declining function of the firm’s funding. The government agency gives the academic
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Figure 2: Best-response functions of research sponsors
scientist a smaller amount of funding when the firm provides substantial funding. The
more substantial the government’s grant, the less funding the firm allocates to the
academic scientist. That the government agency’s best reply is a declining function
of the firm’s funding implies that the firm funding decreases the marginal effect of
government funding on the its expected utility. Likewise, that the firm’s best reply is
a declining function of the government agency’s funding implies that the funding from
the government agency decreases the marginal effect of firm funding on its expected
profit. These relationships arise because the additional chance of solving the problem
using a greater amount of funding declines as the total amount of funding increases.
It is more difficult to increase one’s chances of success by putting in more funding
when the total research funding is abundant because there is a limit on how much
funding contributes to the project’s chance of success.
From the government agency’s point of view, the declining marginal chance of
success generates its best response in the following way. The government agency
contributes a larger marginal chance of success with each unit of its funding when
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the agency is the only sponsor4. Consequently, the government agency receives larger
marginal expected utility for each unit of its funding when it is the sole research spon-
sor. This does not imply that the government agency prefers to be the sole research
sponsor because the probability of success and the government agency’s expected util-
ity increase along with the larger total amount of funding from the increased number
of research sponsors. The government agency welcomes firm contributions and the re-
sulting reduction in the government agency’s marginal expected utility as long as the
reduced marginal expected utility is greater than the marginal loss from not funding
alternative research projects. Recall that the equilibrium level of government agency
funding is the amount of government funding for which its marginal expected util-
ity is equal to its marginal loss from forgoing alternative projects. When the firm
contributes to the academic scientist’s project, the equilibrium level of government
agency funding is the amount of government funding for which its reduced marginal
expected utility is equal to its marginal loss from not funding other projects. At
the equilibrium level, additional firm funding results in a greater reduction in the
marginal expected utility such that it does not compensate for the marginal loss as-
sociated with forgoing alternative research projects. Hence, the government agency
will adjust its contribution by decreasing the amount of funding so that its marginal
expected utility is equal to the marginal expected loss.
A similar explanation can be used to account for the process through which the
4To see this, we can imagine two situations. In both situations, the probability of success increases
by 0.2 for the first unit of funding. The second unit of funding adds to the probability of success
by 0.1. In the first situation, the government agency is the sole research sponsor. By granting one
unit of funding, the government agency receives greater net-expected utility based on an increase
of twenty percent in the chance of success. In the second situation, the academic scientist obtains
funding from a government agency and the firm. Let us suppose that each sponsor provides one
unit of funding. When the government agency grants one unit of funding, the academic scientist
obtains two units of funding because the firm provides another unit of funding. Because there are
two units of funding in total, the probability of success increases by 0.3. This indicates that the
additional chance of success is 0.15 per unit of funding. Unlike in the first situation, in which the
one unit of funding from the government agency increases the chance of success by twenty percent,
the government agency receives greater net-expected utility from an increase of fifteen percent in
the chance of success.
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declining marginal chance of success generates the firm’s best response. Like the
government agency, the firm contributes a larger marginal chance of success for each
unit of its funding when it is the sole sponsor. Accordingly, the firm gains a larger
marginal expected profit from academic research for each unit of its funding when
it is the only sponsor. In other words, the firm’s marginal expected profit from
academic research is reduced along with the government contribution to the academic
scientist’s project. The equilibrium level of firm funding is the amount of funding for
which its reduced marginal expected profit from academic research is equal to its
marginal expected loss of profit by diverting the fund from its own research. At the
equilibrium, further increases in government funding provide a greater reduction in
the marginal expected profit from academic research such that it does not offset the
marginal expected loss of profit from diversion. To accommodate this change, the firm
will decrease the amount of its funding for the academic scientist so that its marginal
expected profit from academic research is the same as the marginal expected loss of
profit associated with diverting funding away from the firm’s research.
Proposition 2.3.2 In the equilibrium of the second stage funding subgame:
1. An increase in the level of problem difficulty of the academic scientist’s project,
xa, increases the level of government funding and decreases the level of firm
funding.
2. An increase in the level of alignment to the firm’s interest, β, decreases the level
of government funding and increases the level of firm funding.
3. An increase in the research-competence of an academic scientist, qa, decreases
the level of government funding and increases the level of firm funding.
4. An increase in the level of problem difficulty of the firm’s project, xc, decreases
the level of government funding and increases the level of firm funding.
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5. An increase in the research-competence of firm’s scientists, qc, increases the
level of government funding and decreases the level of firm funding.
6. An increase in the licensing payment to the university, L, increases the level of
government funding and decreases the level of firm funding.
7. An increase in the share of the licensing payment to the academic scientist, γ
does not have effects on the level of government funding or the level of firm
funding.
Proof. Available at the appendix
An increase in the difficulty of the academic scientist’s problem results in increas-
ing funding from the government agency and decreasing funding from the firm. The
mechanism that generates the effects of an increase in the difficulty of the academic
scientist’s problem can be explained as follows. Because a more challenging problem
reduces the chance of finding a solution, a unit of funding allocated to a difficult
problem contributes less to the probability of success than the same unit of funding
will when allocated to an easy problem. Therefore, the government agency receives
less additional utility from a unit of funding as the difficulty of the problem increases.
Consequently, an increase in problem difficulty reduces the marginal expected utility
of the government agency. Thus, the government agency will be less willing to con-
tribute to the scientist’s project for any given level of firm funding. This indicates
that the government agency’s best response, as depicted in Figure 1, shifts to the left.
For a similar reason, an increase in the difficulty of the academic scientist’s problem
reduces the firm’s marginal expected profit from academic research. Hence, the firm
is willing to contribute less to the academic scientist’s project for any given level of
government agency funding. This lowered willingness indicates that the firm’s best
response shifts down. In response, the government agency becomes willing to con-
tribute more to the academic scientist’s project because its best response is declining
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in the level of firm’s funding.
In summary, the government agency is exposed to two conflicting forces when the
academic scientist’s problem becomes more challenging. One is a decrease in agency
willingness based on its lower marginal expected utility. The other is an increase in
agency willingness based on its lowered contribution. Like the government agency,
the firm experiences two conflicting forces when the academic scientist chooses a
more challenging problem. On one hand, the firm’s willingness to fund the academic
scientist declines because of the lowered marginal expected profit from the academic
research. On the other hand, the firm’s willingness to contribute to the academic
research increases because the government agency is less willing to fund the academic
research. The government agency will experience an increase in willingness based
on its lowered contribution that is larger than the decrease in willingness based on
its lower marginal expected utility. Hence, the government agency provides a larger
amount of funding and the firm reduces its funding.
An increase in the relevance of her research problem to the firm’s field of interest
decreases the level of funding from the government agency and increases the level of
funding from the firm. This adjustment occurs because the firm’s best response shifts
upward. Meanwhile, the government agency’s best response remains unaffected. The
firm’s best response shifts upward because the more relevant the academic scientist’s
problem is to the firm’s interest, the more likely it is that successful academic research
will be beneficial to the firm’s business. Accordingly, the firm’s marginal expected
profit from academic research increases.
When the research-competence of the academic scientist increases, the government
will reduce its level of funding and the firm will increase its level of funding. These
adjustments take place because a unit of funding in the hands of a high-quality
scientist contributes more to the chances of solving the research problem than does
the same unit of funding in the hands of a lower-quality scientist because the more
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competent scientist is more capable of finding a solution to the problem. Accordingly,
an increase in the quality of the academic scientist will result in a greater marginal
expected utility of the government agency. The government agency is willing to
contribute more to the scientist’s project for any given level of firm funding. Thus,
the government agency’s best response shifts to the right.
An increase in the quality of the academic scientist also enhances the firm’s
marginal expected profit from academic research. The firm is willing to allocate
more of its research budget to the academic scientist for any given level of govern-
ment agency funding. Thus, the firm best response shifts upward. Because the
government agency’s best response is declining in the level of firm funding, the gov-
ernment is less willing to provide funding. In short, an increase in the quality of the
academic scientist creates two opposing forces that influence the government agency.
The government agency’s increased willingness to contribute because of the greater
marginal expected utility is less than the government agency’s decreased willingness
to contribute because of the firm’s greater interest in the academic project. There-
fore, the government agency reduces its funding and the firm provides larger amount
of funding.
When the firm’s research problem becomes more challenging, the government
agency reduces its funding, whereas the firm provides the academic scientist with a
larger amount of funding. The reason is that the firm’s best reply shifts upward and
the government agency’s best reply is unchanged. The firm is willing to allocate a
greater proportion of its research budget to the academic scientist because the more
challenging its research problem is, the lower the chance that the firm’s scientist
will solve the problem and the lower the firm’s opportunity cost as associated with
diverting its research funds to the academic project. In contrast, the firm reduces
its funding to the academic scientist and the government grants a larger amount
of funding to her when the firm’s scientist is more competent. This adjustment is
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attributed to the downward shift in the firm’s best reply. Meanwhile, the government’s
best reply is not affected. With a higher quality scientist, the firm gains larger
marginal expected profit from its research. Thus, the firm’s loss of marginal expected
profit as associated with diverting the research budget away from its own research
increases, and the firm is less willing to fund the academic scientist given any level of
government agency funding.
Any changes in the academic scientist’s share of the licensing paid to the university
have no effect on the level of funding from both sponsors. However, an increase in
the licensing paid to the university results in a larger amount of funding from the
government agency and a smaller amount of funding from the firm. This adjustment
occurs because the firm’s best reply shifts downward and the government agency’s
best reply does not change. A larger licensing payment to the university reduces
the firm’s profit from commercializing academic research and the associated expected
profit. Therefore, the firm is willing to provide less funding to the academic scientist.
Consequently, the government agency gives more funding because the government
agency’s best reply is decreasing in the level of firm funding.
2.4 Stage One Equilibrium
In the first stage, the academic scientist decides on the level of difficulty of her project,
xa, and its level of relevance, β. We assume that the academic scientists chooses these
two characteristics based on the equilibrium decisions of research sponsors in the stage
two equilibrium, G∗ (xa, β) and F
∗





∗ (xa, β) , F
∗
a (xa, β) , xa, β) (2.4.1)


















































(U (Rs,Ws)− U (Rf ,Wf ))− V ′ (β) (2.4.5)
When the academic scientist chooses a more challenging problem, this decision has
two opposite effects on expected utility. First, a more difficult problem lessens the
scientist’s probability of success for two reasons. First of all, a more difficult problem is
harder to solve. It also decreases the total funding from research sponsors5, meaning
that the scientist has fewer resources and a lesser chance of finding the solution.
Consequently, the expected utility also declines. Secondly, a more challenging problem
provides greater reputational enhancement and, thus, greater utility. The academic
scientist will increase the difficulty of her research problem until the marginal increase
in her expected utility because of the greater improvement in her reputation is offset
by the marginal decrease in her expected utility because of her reduced chance of
success.
5As noted in the previous section, the government agency increases the level funding and the firm
decreases the level of funding when there is an increase in the difficulty of the academic scientist’s
research problem. The resulting total funding for the academic scientist decreases. This implies
that despite the higher-level funding from the government agency, the additional amount does not
compensate for the reduction in funding from the firm.
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By increasing the relevance of her research project to the firm’s interests, the
academic scientist receives higher expected utility. The reason is that the she has
greater total funding because the firm provides more funding6. With more resources,
the academic scientist has a greater chance of solving the problem. However, the
academic scientist experiences greater disutility based on the relevance of the problem.
As described earlier, the disutility appears because problems that are relevant to the
firm’s field of interest require more effort to solve and because these problems may not
be as relevant to the interests of the scientific community or the academic scientist.
Therefore, the academic scientist increases the relevance of her research problem to
the firm’s field of interest until the marginal gain in her expected utility is equalized
by a marginal increase in disutility.
The academic scientist chooses the level of difficulty of her project, xa, and its
level of relevance, β, which maximize EUa (G
∗ (xa, β) , F
∗
a (xa, β) , xa, β). The level of
difficulty, which maximizes her expected utility at one level of relevance, does not
necessarily maximize her expected utility at another level of relevance. Therefore,
a difficulty best-choice function, x̂a (β), is the level of difficulty that maximizes the
academic scientist’s expected utility for any level of relevance. In the same way, the
level of relevance that maximizes the expected utility at one level of difficulty does not
always maximize the expected utility at a different level of difficulty. The relevance
best-choice function, β̂ (xa), is the level of relevance that maximizes the academic
scientist’s expected utility for a research problem at any level of difficulty.
Proposition 2.4.1 The difficulty best-choice function and the relevance best-choice
function are positively sloped.
Proof. Available at the appendix
6In the previous section, we also describe how the firm’s equilibrium level of funding increases
with the relevance of the academic scientist’s project. At the same time, the government agency
reduces its equilibrium level of funding. The reduction in funding from the government agency is
lower than the additional funding from the firm. Thus, the total funding increases.
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An academic scientist chooses a more challenging problem when her chosen prob-
lem is more relevant to the firm’s interests. She selects a problem that is less relevant
to the firm’s interests if the problem is less challenging. In other words, the diffi-
culty best-choice function is an increasing function of the level of relevance, and the
relevance best-choice function is an increasing function of the level of difficulty. An
example of difficulty and relevance best-choices is illustrated in the figures below.
Figure 3: Best-choice functions of an academic scientist
The mechanism underlying these best-choice functions is the following. As previ-
ously mentioned, the academic scientist increases the level of problem difficulty until
the marginal gain in her expected utility because of the greater increase in her repu-
tation is offset by the marginal decrease in the expected utility because of her lowered
chance of success. The extra funding that the problem relevance inspires increases
both the scientist’s marginal gain in expected utility from the more challenging prob-
lem and her marginal loss in expected utility from the easier problem. This implies
that an academic scientist earns a larger marginal expected utility from problem diffi-
culty when she aligns her research project with the firm’s interests. The scientist also
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receives a larger marginal expected utility from relevance when the scientist works on
a more challenging problem.
The scientist experiences an increase in the marginal gain that is greater than
the increase in the marginal loss because of two reasons. Receiving more generous
funding based on increased relevance, the academic scientist has a greater chance of
achieving the additional utility from the more challenging problem if she allocates the
extra funding to the difficult project. The extra funding also attenuates the impact
of the reduction in funding that occurs when the academic scientist increases the
level of difficulty of the problem. Because she will suffer fewer consequences from
increasing the level of difficulty, the academic scientist will be willing to take on a
more challenging problem.
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These conditions state that an increase in the quality of the academic scientist,
in difficulty of the firm’s own project, or in the licensing payment to the university
decreases the marginal effect of the level of difficulty on the stage-two equilibrium
probability of success of the academic scientist’s project. An increase in the quality
of firm’s scientist increases the marginal effect of the level of difficulty on the stage-
two equilibrium probability of success. Furthermore, an academic scientist who works
on a difficult project enjoys a higher marginal expected utility when she has more
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than less funding. This situation occurs when the firm has low opportunity cost
associated with low research-competence of its scientists. The situation also happens
when the firm has to work on a difficult problem. In addition, an academic scientist
who has higher research-competence enjoys larger additional expected utility from a
more challenging problem than a less competent scientist. Meanwhile, an increase
in the research-competence of an academic scientist increases the marginal effect of
relevance, thus the additional funding brought into the project, in the stage-two
equilibrium probability of success.
Proposition 2.4.2 Assume that second-order effects on the equilibrium funding from
government agency and from the firm are negligible, ∂
2G∗
∂i∂j
≈ 0 and ∂
2F ∗a
∂i∂j
≈ 0, for all
parameters i and j. Then:
1. An increase in the research-competence of academic scientist, qa, increase the
level of problem difficulty and the level of alignment to the firm’s interest.
2. An increase in the research-competence of firm’s scientist, qc, decreases the level
of problem difficulty and the level of alignment to the firm’s interest
3. An increase in the level of difficulty of the firm’s research problem, xc, increases




> δγ ,an increase in the academic scientist’s share of licensing paid
to the university, γ, decreases the level of problem difficulty and the level of
alignment to the firm’s interest when ∂
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Proof. Available at the appendix
A more competent academic scientist increases the challenge and the relevance
of the research project. Her decision will stem from the following process. A more
competent academic scientist obtains a larger marginal expected utility from relevance
because a higher-quality scientist can better utilize the extra funding from relevance.
Hence, the more capable scientist has a greater chance of finding a solution. Thus,
the academic scientist is willing to make her research project better aligned with
the firm’s interests, and the best-choice function for relevance, as in Figure 2, shifts
upward. The consequence of this upward shift is a greater willingness to undertake a
more challenging problem because the scientist’s best-choice function for difficulty is
upward sloping.
An academic scientist who has higher research-competence also receives a larger
marginal expected utility from problem difficulty because a higher-quality scientist
not only is superior in finding a solution but also attracts a larger amount of research
funding. Hence, the academic scientist is willing to increase the level of problem
difficulty. This implies that the best-choice function for difficulty shifts to the right.
Consequently, the academic scientist further increases the level of difficulty and the
level of relevance of the research problem.
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When the research-competence of the firm’s scientist increases, the academic sci-
entist chooses a less challenging and less relevant problem. These adjustments orig-
inate from the following mechanism. Having hired a more competent scientist, the
firm incurs a larger opportunity cost in diverting its research budget away from the
firm’s own research. As a result, the firm cuts down its funding to the academic
scientist7. Having received less funding, the academic scientist then obtains lower
marginal expected utility if she selects a more challenging problem. First, the aca-
demic scientist endures a larger decline in funding because she bears not only the
reduction in funding caused by the increased difficulty of the problem but also a re-
duction in funding caused by the larger opportunity cost to the firm. Secondly, the
academic scientist has a smaller chance to achieve the additional utility that can re-
sult from choosing a more challenging problem because there is less funding available
to her as a result of the better quality of the firm’s scientist. Because an increase in
the research-competence of the firm’s scientist reduces the effect of problem difficulty
on the marginal expected utility, an academic scientist will prefer a less challenging
problem at any level of relevance. Thus, the best-choice function for difficulty shifts
to the left.
When the firm employs a more competent scientist, an academic scientist whose
research project is more closely aligned with the firm’s interests will enjoy greater
marginal expected utility. The reason is that the academic scientist will receive extra
funding. As a result, she suffers less from the reduction in funding as the firm’s op-
portunity cost increases. Under these circumstances, the academic scientist obtains a
greater additional chance of success by aligning her project with the firm’s interests.
Consequently, the academic scientist prefers a higher level of relevance for any level
7In the previous section, we describe how the firm reduces its equilibrium level of funding with
an increase in the quality of the firm’s scientist. At the same time, the government agency increases
its equilibrium level of funding. However, the reduction in funding from the firm is larger than the
additional funding from the government agency. Thus, the total funding becomes smaller.
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of difficulty. Thus, the best-choice function for relevance shifts upward. The implica-
tion of this upward shift is that the academic scientist is more willing to undertake a
difficult problem because the scientist’s best-choice function for difficulty is upward
sloping. The academic scientist will select a less challenging and less relevant prob-
lem because the encouragement caused by the increasing relevance of the problem is
smaller than the disincentive caused by the decline in firm funding.
An academic scientist will select a more challenging and more relevant problem
when the firm’s research problem becomes more difficult. These adjustments arise
from the following process. As its own research problem becomes more difficult, the
chance that the firm will develop a solution to that problem declines. This means
that the firm will incur lower opportunity costs if it allocates less funding to the
problem. Thus, the firm is more willing to provide research funding to the academic
scientist8. In receiving more funding, an academic scientist obtains larger marginal
expected utility if she works on a more difficult problem. As previously explained,
extra funding attenuates the impact of reductions in funding when the academic
scientist increases the level of difficulty. In addition, the academic scientist has a
better chance of achieving the additional utility, a result of the increased difficulty
level, because the project has more funding, a result of the decline in the firm’s
opportunity cost. Thus, an academic scientist will favor a more difficult problem for
any level of relevance. It indicates that the best-choice function for difficulty shifts
to the right.
Another implication of the increased difficulty of the firm’s problem is that it
reduces the marginal gains of the expected utility that result from increasing the level
of relevance. As previously mentioned, the firm provides a larger amount of funding to
8In the previous section, we note that the firm provides a higher equilibrium level of funding
when the difficulty of its own research increases. In response, the government agency then decreases
its equilibrium level of funding. The additional funding from the firm is greater than the reduction
in funding by the government agency. Therefore, the total funding increases.
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the academic scientist. The academic scientist experiences a lower additional chance
of success because, as the total funding increases, it is harder for the extra funding
associated with the greater relevance of the problem to increase the scientist’s chances
of success. Thus, the academic scientist prefers a lower level of relevance for any level
of difficulty, and the best-choice function for relevance shifts downward. In the light
of this downward shift, an academic scientist will prefer a less challenging problem
because the scientist’s best-choice function is upward sloping. The academic scientist
will decide on a more difficult and more relevant problem because the inducement
caused by additional funding is larger than the disincentive caused by decreasing
relevance.
The implications of an increase in the licensing paid to the university are not
straightforward, but rather contingent upon the extent of complementarity between
problem difficulty and its relevance. When the licensing paid to the university in-
creases, the firm retains a smaller profit from commercializing a successful academic
research project. Consequently, the firm will have less interest in the academic sci-
entist’s research and will reduce its support9. However, the academic scientist will
obtain more additional income if her research project is successful. If the academic
scientist increases the difficulty of the research problem, she will receive a smaller
marginal expected utility. First, an academic scientist has less of a chance of achiev-
ing additional income both because the problem is harder to solve and because the
research sponsors react by reducing the amount of funding. Secondly, the academic
scientist suffers more from a reduction in funding based on increasing problem dif-
ficulty because she already receives less funding because of the increased licensing
9As explained in the earlier section, the firm cuts down the amount of equilibrium level of funding
when the licensing paid to the university increases. In response, the government agency provides a
larger amount of equilibrium level of funding. The reduction of funding from the firm is larger than
the additional funding from the government agency. Hence, the total funding declines.
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revenue. This implies that in increasing difficulty of her research problem, the aca-
demic scientist experiences a larger decline in her probability of success when the
licensing revenue increases. Thirdly, the academic scientist has less of a chance to ob-
tain the additional reputation by working a more challenging problem because of her
lowered funding (which, again, results from the increase in licensing revenue). Thus,
the academic scientist prefers a less challenging problem for any level of relevance.
That is, the best-choice for difficulty level shifts to the left.
In addition to its influence on the effect of difficulty, an increase in the licensing
paid to the university changes the effect of problem relevance. An academic scientist
gains larger net-marginal expected utility if she chooses a problem that is more rel-
evant to the firm’s interests. As previously discussed, the firm will allocate a larger
amount of funding to an academic scientist whose problem is more relevant. This
extra funding attenuates the decline in the academic scientist’s total funding when
the firm cuts down its contribution because of the increase in licensing revenue. Fur-
thermore, the extra funding gives the scientist a better chance of solving the problem.
Accordingly, the scientist will be more likely to earn additional income from increased
licensing revenue. Hence, the academic scientist will select a problem with greater
relevance at any level of difficulty, and the best-choice function for relevance shifts
upward. When the best-choice function for relevance shifts upward, a more challeng-
ing problem becomes more attractive because the academic scientist’s best-choice
function for difficulty is upward sloping.
The steepness of the slopes of best-choice functions indicates the extent of com-
plementarity between the level of difficulty and the level of relevance. When licensing
paid to the university increases, the academic scientist will choose a more challeng-
ing but less relevant problem if the level of difficulty and the level of relevance are
highly complementary as shown by steep slopes. If the level of difficulty and level
of relevance are low to moderate in complementarity, the academic scientist prefers
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a less difficult and less relevant problem when the marginal effect of relevance on
academic scientist expected utility declines rapidly. However, the academic scientist
favors a more difficult and more relevant problem when the amount of licensing rev-
enue paid to the university substantially enhances the marginal effect of relevance on
her expected utility.
When her share of the licensing revenue increases, an academic scientist receives
more additional income if her research project is successful. However, the academic
scientist obtains a smaller marginal expected utility by increasing difficulty level be-
cause the academic scientist has a smaller chance of achieving the additional utility
based the larger income. The possibility for such achievement is smaller because her
chance of success declines as research sponsors reduces their funding and the problem
becomes harder to solve. Consequently, the academic scientist prefers a less challeng-
ing problem at any level of relevance, and the best-choice function for difficulty shifts
to the left.
Unlike its negative implication to the effect of difficulty on the marginal expected
utility, an increase in the academic scientist’s share of licensing revenue enables an
academic scientist to receive a larger marginal expected utility if she chooses a research
problem that is more relevant to the firm’s interests. The explanation is as follows.
Recall that the firm provides a larger amount of funding to a more relevant project.
Because the academic scientist who has access to a larger amount of funding has a
greater chance of finding a solution to her research problem, she is more likely to
achieve the additional utility resulting from the larger income. Thus, the academic
scientist favors a research project that is more relevant to the firm’s interests for any
level of difficulty. This indicates that the best-choice function for relevance shifts
upward. Hence, a more challenging problem becomes favorable because the academic
scientist’s best-choice function for difficulty is upward sloping.
If the slopes of best-choice functions are not too steep, the level of difficulty and
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level of relevance are low to moderate complementarity. In these situations, an aca-
demic scientist will choose a less difficult and less relevant problem when the marginal
effect of relevance on academic scientist expected utility declines rapidly. Experienc-
ing similar levels of complementarity, an academic scientist will prefer a more difficult
and more relevant problem when her share of licensing revenue substantially enhances
the marginal effect of relevance on her expected utility. If the slopes of best-choice
functions are steep, the level of difficulty and the level of relevance are highly com-
plementary. In these circumstances, academic scientist will choose a more difficult
problem but less relevant problem when her share of licensing revenue increases.
2.5 The University’s Shares of Research Funding
In this section we consider the situation that universities are institutions that must
generate income (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Bok, 2003). For example, universities in
the US receive shares from research funding regardless the outcome of the project. We
use (1− δG) and (1− δF ) to denote the university’s share of research funding from the
government agency and from the firm respectively, where δG ∈ (0, 1). Consequently,
the academic scientist receives δGG of the agency’s funding, G, and she receives
δFFa of the firm’s funding, Fa. Meanwhile, the university obtains (1− δG)G and
(1− δF )Fa10. Thus, the level of funding on the academic scientist’s project is
10The specification that G = δGG + (1− δG)G captures the effect of university mark-up and
academic scientist’s share from it. In order to see this, suppose that the academic scientist submits
a proposal requesting an amount of Gs. We denote the university’s mark-up on the government
agency funding by µG where µG ∈ (0, 1). Thus, G = µGGs + Gs. The university gives some of
its revenue, µGGs, to the academic scientist. Let θ be the fraction that academic scientist receives
from university’s revenue from government research funding, where θ ∈ (0, 1). We can rewrite G =
(1− θ)µGGs+θµGGs+Gs = (1− θ)µGGs+(θµG + 1)Gs, where (1− θ)µGGs goes to the university
and (θµG + 1)Gs goes to the academic scientist. Let Ku be the amount received by the university
from the government agency’s funding, G, and let Ks be the amount received by the academic
scientist from the government agency’s funding, G. Then, Ku = (1− δG)G = (1− θ)µGGs, and










< 0, and ∂Ku∂δG < 0. In order to see that the specification that Fa = δFFa+(1− δF )Fa captures
the effect of university mark-up and academic scientist’s share from it, a similar explanation is
applied.
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ea = δGG+ δFFa (2.5.1)
The first-order conditions in the second stage are
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(U (Rs,Ws)− U (Rf ,Wf ))− V ′ (β) = 0
(2.5.5)
As before, the government agency increases the level of funding until the marginal
effect of government funding on its expected utility is offset by the marginal loss; and
the firm will increase the level of funding to the academic scientist until the marginal
effect of its funding on the expected profit from the academic research is offset by the
marginal expected loss of profit from the firm’s research. In the first stage, the process
of decision making remains. That is, the academic scientist will increase the difficulty
of her research problem until the marginal increase in her expected utility because
of the greater improvement in her reputation is offset by the marginal decrease in
her expected utility because of her reduced chance of success; and she increases the
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relevance of her research problem to the firm’s field of interest until the marginal gain
in her expected utility is equalized by a marginal increase in disutility.
Stage-two equilibrium and extant comparative statics do not change by the inclu-
sion of the academic scientist’s and the university’s shares of research funding. In
the same way, the equilibrium and extant comparative statics in stage-one equilib-
rium remains despite the presence of academic scientist’s and the university’s shares
of research funding. However, the effects of these shares on the level of government
funding, the level of firm funding, and the academic scientist’s choice of research
project are ambiguous.
2.6 Direct Benefits of Research Funding
In the earlier sections, we consider indirect effects of research funding on the utility
of an academic scientist. Research funding indirectly influence the utility of an aca-
demic scientist through the effect of resource on the probability of solving a research
problem. Besides indirect effects, research funding directly influence the utility of an
academic scientist. The direct effect is positive and independent of research output.
For example, research funding enhances the power of an academic scientist in the
department or university (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). The academic scientist may
use this power to obtain a bigger office, to obtain nicer equipments, to provide fellow-
ships for students, and to avoid doing committee work. Research funding also allows
the faculty to buy out teaching, and it relieves any possible disutility associated with
teaching. For simplicity, we abstract from academic scientist’s and the university’s
share of research funding. We define Ud (ea) that is the direct benefit of research
funding on academic scientist’s utility. It is increasing in its argument and concave.
The academic scientist’s expected utility, EUa (G,Fa, xa, β), is
pa (ea, qa, xa)U (Rs,Ws) + [1− pa (ea, qa, xa)]U (Rf ,Wf ) + Ud (ea)− V (β) (2.6.1)
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Stage-two equilibrium and its related comparative statics do not change by the
































































− V ′ (β)
= 0
(2.6.3)
When deciding the level of difficulty, the academic scientist will increase the dif-
ficulty of her research problem until the marginal increase in her expected utility
because of the greater improvement in her reputation is offset by the marginal de-
crease in her expected utility because of her reduced chance of success and because
of lower direct benefits. When choosing the level of relevance, the academic scientist
increases the relevance of her research problem to the firm’s field of interest until the
marginal gain in her expected utility is equalized by a marginal increase in disutility.
The marginal gain in her expected utility arises because additional funding from the
firm improve the chance of solving the problem and because of the larger utility from
direct benefits.
Similar to the section where only indirect effect of research funding is considered,
the difficulty best-choice function and the relevance best-choice function are positively
sloped. Moreover, inclusion of direct benefits does not affect the comparative statics
involving the level of difficulty of firm’s research problem, the amount of licensing paid
to the university, and the academic scientist’s share of licensing paid to the university.
It is reasonable to assume that, in an academic community, the utility related with
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research output, such as the utility from scientific reputation and wage, dominates
the utility unrelated to research output, such as the utility from direct benefits of
research funding. By this assumption, the comparative statics involving research-
competence of academic scientist and research-competence of firm’s scientists are the
same as those in the earlier section.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The custom that we use to comprehend the linkages between scientific systems and
economic systems is non-linear relationships (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). While
the idea that science is not completely exogenous is well accepted, the challenge is
to identify the linkage between the scientific system and the economic system so
that the idea has practical implications (Rosenberg, 1982). Rosenberg argues that
the economic system influences the scientific system for two reasons. One is that
doing science is costly. The other fact is that scientific research can be directed
toward economically profitable areas of inquiry. The majority of the extant studies
that investigate the impact of commercialization activities on academic scientists’
research orientation have concentrated on the second reason. This paper adds to
the body of research that has brought both factors into play in examining academic
scientists’ choice of research projects. We have shown how two types of linkages
between scientific system and economic system, licensing and funding, shape academic
scientists’ selections of research problems.
There are several limitations to the approach taken in this paper. First, it does not
explore how competition among scientists (e.g., Walsh and Hong, 2009), the career
life cycle of academic scientists (e.g., Levin and Stephan, 1991; Thursby, Thursby,
and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2007), their previous accomplishments (e.g., Lazear, 1997) or
prior disclosure activities (Thursby and Thursby, 2009b) may affect decisions regard-
ing research problems. Furthermore, this paper only takes into account academic
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scientists who stay in academia and abstracts from the scenarios in which academic
scientists have the option to leave academia (Jensen and Thursby, 2004). In ad-
dition, analyzing the type of commercialization link created by licensing academic
research to an established firm excludes circumstances in which university research is
commercialized by founding new firms, including those begun by academic scientists
(Jensen and Showalter, 2008; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003). Moreover, the model
is limited to situations in which an principal invesigator may obtain funding from
multiple agencies. Despite these caveats, the question of how academic scientists ac-
tualize their scientific freedom should not be overlooked. Academic scientists select
research problems with the aim of having their findings published even in instances
in which commercial profit is possible (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). In line with
this view, the results of a survey by Walsh, Cohen, and Cho (2007) reveal that for
97% of respondents, scientific importance is one of the main reasons for choosing a
research project, whereas only 8% of respondents reported that commercial potential
is one of the main reasons for selecting research projects.
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CHAPTER III
ACADEMIC SCIENTISTS: THE NATURE OF
RESEARCH AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIONS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses how academic scientists’ decision to create new ventures is
influenced by the nature of research, specifically the level of commercial applicabil-
ity. The approach taken builds on extant studies that argue that the opportunity
cost of engaging in non-research activities is less time spent on scientists’ labora-
tory work (e.g., Levin and Stephan, 1991; Thursby, Thursby and Gupta-Mukherjee,
2007; Jensen, Thursby and Thursby, 2010). The model shows that the opportunity
cost is attenuated because knowledge is transferred from successful entrepreneurial
actions to scientists’ research agenda. The attenuation is larger for some academic
scientists than for others, depending on the nature of their respective research. The
model explains academic scientist’s nature of research in one dimension: the level of
commercial applicability. This dimension spans a continuum from low to high.
Within the continuum of commercial applicability, there is a point after which a
scientist is willing to create a new venture. Before reaching that point on the con-
tinuum, the scientist will not create a new venture. Within this continuum, there is
another point starting from which an established firm is willing to license the scien-
tist’s invention. If the point after which a scientist deems an invention commercially
applicable, and is thus willing to create a new venture, is less than the point at which
an established firm believes it is commercially applicable, and is thus willing to li-
cense the invention, we will observe that scientists who have the highest probability
of creating new ventures are those whose level of commercial applicability is medium.
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Scientists whose nature of research is low and high in the dimension of level of com-
mercial applicability will have lower probability than scientists with medium level
of commercial applicability. In this case, there is an inverted-u shape relationship
between the level of commercial applicability and the likelihood that an academic
scientist creates a new venture. When the level of commercial applicability which an
academic scientist decides to create a new venture is higher than the level of com-
mercial applicability which an established firm is interested to license the invention,
we predict a decreasing relationship between level of commercial applicability and
the likelihood that an academic scientist creates a new venture. Empirical estimation
of the model is performed on a sample of 395 academic scientists at five top U.S.
research universities.
3.2 The Model
This section presents a theoretical analysis of an academic scientist’s decision to
create a new venture. As the starting point of the game, an academic scientist has
disclosed his invention to the university. At this first stage, the university evaluates
the invention and has two choices: to shelve (i.e. give the invention to the academic
scientist) or not to shelve the invention. If the university shelves the invention, the
academic scientist can choose either to create a new venture based on the shelved
invention or to work on another research project instead. If the university decides
not to shelve the invention, at the second stage, the university can either search for
a licensee or offer the academic scientist the option to create a new venture based
on the invention licensed by the university. Facing such an offer at this stage, the
academic scientist chooses whether or not to create a new venture. Figure 4 depicts
the extensive form of the game.
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Figure 4: Academic entrepreneurship: Extensive form of the game
3.2.1 The Academic Scientist
An academic scientist is associated with his level of scientific prominence, q. His
scientific prominence determines his probability of success should he found a new
venture, p(q). The probability of success, a function of q, is both increasing and
concave because more prominent scientists are more likely to get resources. For
instance, prominent scientists are better able to attract partners or signal to investors
that they perform exceptional assessment of the technology (Higgins, Stephan, and
Thursby, 2008). For simplicity, we assume risk neutrality. In the case of successful
commercialization, the academic scientist gains utility from non-scientific return, B,
such as money and satisfaction from having a practical impact (e.g., reaching people).
He also obtains utility from scientific return (i.e. knowledge), K. The extent to
which his scientific return from commercialization activity is valuable for his research
at the university depends on a, which is the level of commercialization applicability
of the academic scientist’s research orientation. Where a > 0, this transferability
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of knowledge from the commercialization activity to university research is known
in the literature as the Mansfield effect (e.g., Mansfield, 1995; Jensen, Thursby, and
Thursby, 2010). For the amount of time which the scientist allocates to creating a new
venture, he could have allocated it to his research at the university. We denote such
opportunity cost as r(q)K where K is knowledge (i.e. scientific benefit) generated
at the university if the scientist does not found a new ventures. Furthermore, r(q)
is an academic parameter where r(q) > 0, r′ > 0, and r′′ > 0, showing that the
opportunity cost of doing science at the university is higher for prominent scientists
than for average scientists because prominent scientists produce scientific results of
higher quality or volume.
The academic scientist’s expected return from creating a new venture is EUIs =
p(q)(B + aK). The scientist creates a new venture if and only if
p (q) (B + aK) ≥ r (q)K (3.2.1)
Equation (1) can be rewritten as p(q)B +K(ap(q)− r(q)) ≥ 0. This leads to





















Proof. Available at the appendix
For a scientist to be willing to create a new venture, the expected return from
founding the venture must be greater than the scientific return from concentrating on
university research. Since the outcome of successful commercialization comprises two
types, namely scientific and non-scientific, the scientific benefit from successful com-
mercialization attenuates the opportunity cost of spending less time at the university
research. Hence, the minimum level of non-scientific benefit, such that creating a new
venture is an attractive option, is reduced. Compared to average scientists, prominent
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scientists expect both greater non-scientific and scientific benefit from creating new
ventures. In other words, prominent scientists have not only greater expected non-
scientific benefit, but also greater reduction of their opportunity cost. At the same
time, their opportunity cost from spending less time at the university research is also
greater than that of average scientists. Prominent scientists are more likely to create
new ventures than average scientists when the elasticity of probability of success due
to scientific prominence is greater than the elasticity of academic parameter.
3.2.2 The University
The university payoff is zero if the academic scientist decides not to create a new
venture based on a university-licensed invention. If the academic scientist accepts the
offer, the university obtains returns from two sources, BU and L. BU is the university’s
return from successful commercialization (e.g., income). L is the university’s return
from simply licensing an invention, regardless of whether or not the commercializa-
tion is successful (Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby, 2003). The university also incurs
disutility, VUs that comes both from supporting the academic scientist and from the
cost of forgoing the opportunity of promoting other disclosed inventions that might
have a higher probability of successful commercialization. Although the university
gets utility simply from executing a license to the academic scientist, the disutility
from supporting the scientist does not payoff unless the new venture is successful,
EUUs = L − VUs < 0. Thus, the university’s expected utility from supporting the
academic entrepreneur is
EUUs = p (q)BU + L− VUs (3.2.2)
To solve the university’s problem at information set U.2, first consider a subgame
between the university and a potential firm licensee. The university cannot even give
a license away unless the probability of commercial success is high enough (Jensen,
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Thursby, and Thursby, 2003). Since the extent of the firm’s effort (including invest-
ment in capital and human resources) depends on the level of commercial applicability
of the invention, the university will not search for a licensee unless pF (a) ≥ VF (a) /R
where pF (a) is the probability of commercialization success if the invention is further
developed by the firm. The probability of success by the firm licensee is increasing
in its argument and concave. We denote VF (a) as the firm’s disutility from the com-
mercialization effort. It is increasing in its argument and convex. We denote R as
the return to the firm licensee if the commercialization is successful. We also assume





such that p (q) < pF (a) when max(a)
for all q. These specifications show that the probability of commercialization success
by an academic scientist is larger than that of commercialization success by licensee
firms when the research orientation of academic scientist, hence his invention, is low
in the level of commercial applicability; this is true since the academic scientist has
the tacit knowledge to further develop the embryonic invention (Jensen and Thursby,
2001). The specifications also indicate that the probability of success by a firm li-
censee is larger than the probability of success by the academic scientist when the
research orientation of the academic scientist, hence his invention, is high in the level
of commercial applicability. This illustrates the fact that the higher an invention’s
level of commercial applicability, the better a firm licensee can utilize its existing as-
sets to successfully commercialize it. In other words, the higher the invention’s level
of commercial applicability, the greater is a firm licensee’s advantage from possessing
complementary assets. If the university searches for a licensee, it incurs disutility
from searching, VUl. The university’s expected utility from licensing is thus:
EUUl = pF (a)BU + L− VUl (3.2.3)
While the university’s payoff from supporting an academic scientist’s venture is
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positive only when the commercialization is successful, it is possible that the uni-
versity searches for a licensee even if the commercialization will not be successful,
EUUl = L − VUl > 0. These two conditions reflect higher disutility from supporting
academic scientists. Unlike licensing to an established firm, the university responsi-
bility does not end by the signing of licensing contracts, but rather it entails providing
the academic scientist supports such as preparing business plans and connecting aca-
demic entrepreneurs to potential partners (e.g., surrogate entrepreneurs or VCs). If
the university licenses the invention to a firm licensee, the academic scientist is in-
volved in the further development, and thus the non-academic benefit from successful
commercialization to established firm is normalized to zero. The former is in line
with the fact that university invention is embryonic such that the involvement of an
academic scientist is needed for successful commercialization (Jensen and Thursby,
2001). The latter is justified by the magnitude of difference between the satisfac-
tion that comes from creating a successful new venture and that which comes from
consulting, respectively . Thus, the academic scientist’s expected utility when the
invention is licensed to a firm is
EUIl = pF (a) (aK) + (1− pF (a)) (0) (3.2.4)





and pF (af ) =
VF (af)
R
1. When af > as, the likelihood that the academic scientist engages in creating
a new venture increases until a cut-off point, ā , after which the likelihood of
creating a new venture decreases.
2. When af > as, an increase in the academic scientist’s prominence, q, increases
the cutoff point, ā.
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3. When af ≤ as, the likelihood that the academic scientist engages in creating a
new venture decreases as variable a increases.
Proof. Available at the appendix
First consider the situation in which the scientist’s willingness to create a new
venture occurs earlier in the continuum of level of commercial applicability than the
point on the continuum where the established firm becomes interested in licensing
the invention. Academic scientists whose research orientation entails a low level of
commercial applicability do not find it worthwhile to found new ventures because
the expected return does not compensate for the opportunity cost of ceasing to focus
on university research. Increasing commercial applicability increases the incentive
for academic scientists to engage in entrepreneurship because of the greater expected
entrepreneurial return, which comes from the greater scientific benefit of the activity.
As long as there is no established firm interested in licensing the invention and its net
expected return from supporting the scientist entrepreneur is positive, the university
does not shelve the invention and, instead, will support the scientist’s venture.
However, as commercial applicability increases, the established firm’s expected
return from licensing the scientist’s invention also increases. At an equal expected re-
turn from either licensing to an established firm or supporting a scientist entrepreneur,
the university incurs higher cost from the latter, which makes supporting a scientist
entrepreneur the less attractive option. That is, although the scientist’s willingness to
create new ventures increases in the level of commercial applicability, the university’s
willingness to support the scientist’s venture decreases in the level of commercial
applicability. Hence, once the established firms are interested in licensing the scien-
tist’s invention, there is a decline in the likelihood that the scientist will create a new
venture. The point of decline, however, depends on the scientific prominence of the
scientist. That is, it is easier for scientists of higher prominence to attract the re-
sources required for a successful venture. Their prominence both lures talented team
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members and can tacitly indicate to an investor the high quality of their assessment of
the scientific potential of their invention (Higgins, Stephan, and Thursby, 2008). To
elaborate on the latter point, it must be understood that scientists of higher promi-
nence can assess the scientific potential of inventions better than average scientists
can. If the scientist who pursues the commercialization (i.e. creates the new venture)
has high prominence, the investor takes it as an indication that the scientific potential
of the technology is better assessed. Since the good quality of the assessment is part of
an investors’ consideration in allocating investments, highly prominent scientists are
more likely to get this resource than are average scientists. Thus, increasing scientific
prominence delays the point of declines in the likelihood of a scientist’s creation of a
new venture.
Next, consider the situation in which the established firm’s interest to license the
invention occurs earlier than the scientist’s willingness to create a new venture on
the continuum of the level of commercial applicability. In this situation, the scientist
who is willing to create a new venture is always faced with the university that as
two alternative commercialization options (i.e. support the scientist’s venture or
license the invention to an established firm). In other words, the scientist interested
in creating a new venture is always in the area where the university’s willingness
to support the scientist’s venture decreases in the level of commercial applicability.
Hence, there is no area on the continuum of level of commercial applicability where
the scientist’s likelihood of creating a new venture increases. There is a decline in the
scientist’s likelihood of creating a new venture as the level of commercial applicability
increases.
Note that the model does not necessitate that the university’s objective contradicts
that of the academic scientist. To see this, consider the situation when an academic
scientist prefers licensing the invention to an established firm. This preference occurs
when EUIl > EUIs. That is, pF (a) (aK) > p (q) (B + aK) ⇔ [pF (a)− p (q)] aK −
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p (q)B > 0. The equation shows that as a increases, the right hand side of the
equation increases, indicating that an academic scientist would rather license to an
established firm than to found a new venture. The reason is that the academic
scientist can gain knowledge benefit by riding on the established firm, which increases
the probability of success. Academic scientists who would likely find this option
less appealing are those with high scientific prominence because these high profile
scientists have a higher expected return of non-academic benefit.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Research Setting
The academic scientists in our study are faculty members who are listed in bimolecu-
lar, electrical engineering, and computer science departments at five top U.S. research
universities. The sample is not random, and the characteristic of universities is cho-
sen because top U.S. research universities drive new technology ventures based on
university research (O’Shea and Allen, 2008). In addition, the three departments, es-
pecially life sciences (e.g., biomolecular), have been used in previous studies as settings
of university technology transfer (e.g., Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998; Agrawal and
Henderson, 2002).
3.3.2 Data and Sample
The database comprises academic scientists at MIT, The University of Minnesota at
Twin Cities, The University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and The
University of Wisconsin at Madison. In a first step toward creating an academic-
entrepreneur database, we identified the names of faculty members who are listed in
bimolecular, electrical engineering, and computer science departments in the National
Research Council (1995). Based on this initial list, we collected their curriculum vi-
tas (CVs) from university websites, their publication lists from ISI Web of Science,
and their patent list from USPTO and Delphion. In the second step, we identified
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whether the academic scientists started new ventures. We identified academic en-
trepreneurs from CVs and web searches (i.e. google search). In the first part of the
third step, we matched academic scientists’ publication lists from ISI Web of Science
with information in their CVs, such as their statements of research interests, prior
affiliations, and selected publication lists. The second part of this third step entailed
a similar procedure performed on academic scientists’ patent lists from USPTO and
Delphion. In the fourth step, we matched the resulting publication list from the
second step with the National Science Foundation-IpiQ 2007 journal classification
system (i.e. NSF/IpiQ classification). IpiQ classification categorizes journals into
four categories: 1 indicates applied technology, 2 indicate engineering and technolog-
ical science, 3 indicates applied research, targeted basic research, and 4 indicate basic
scientific research. For ease of interpretation of econometric analysis, we recoded the
categories such that 1 indicates basic scientific research, 2 indicates applied research,
targeted basic research, 3 indicates engineering and technological science, targeted
basic research, and 4 indicates applied technology.
The four steps result in 395 academic scientists whose CVs are available on-line
and for whom the matching process (i.e. the third step) was possible. Out of 395
academic scientists, 101 scientists created new ventures. These scientists published
a total of 35,840 publications. In addition, they are listed as inventors in a total of
6,558 patents.
3.3.3 Variables and Measures
Dependent variable: Startup
Our dependent variable, startup, was binary, with 1 indicating academic scientists
who founded new technology ventures. As our dependent was binary, we applied a
logistic regression model estimating how the nature of research and scientific promi-
nence affect the probability of an academic scientist engaging in entrepreneurship.
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Independent variables
In order to capture the nature of research, an independent variable research orien-
tation was constructed based on NSF/iPiQ classification. We calculated the research
orientation variable as follow:
research orientation = 1− number of publication rated by NSF/IpiQ as basic scientific research
Total number of publication rated by NSF/IpiQ
Academic scientists whose research is low in the level of commercial applicability
are associated with a low value of research orientation variable. In order to capture
the non-linear relationship between the nature of research and the creation of new
technology ventures, we constructed an independent variable research orientation
square.
The independent variable for scientific prominence is measured by an average
number of publications per year. We calculated the average number of publications
is calculated as follow:
average number of publication per year = Total number of publications
Number of active year
We define ’number of active years’ as the number of years from PhD completion
until retirement. We consider the length of an academic career to be approximately
35 years. The calculation of ’number of active years’ is as follows: if the sum of year
of PhD completion and thirty five is less than 2008, ’number of active years’ is 35; if
the sum of year of PhD completion and thirty five is greater than 2008, ’number of
active years’ is 2008 minus the year of PhD completion.
In order to test proposition 2.3, we construct a variable bio x research orientation.
The variable bio is 1 for academic scientists in the life sciences discipline. Since the
research of the life sciences is characteristically basic in nature yet also relevant to
practical problems (i.e. Pasteur Quadrant’s, Stokes (1997)), the research output of
scientists in the life sciences is close to the interest of existing firms in the industry.
Control variables
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Since literature in entrepreneurship indicates that women are less likely than men
to start new businesses (Shane, 2004) and that woman scientists are less likely to be
involved in the commercialization of their research (Ding, Murray, and Stuart, 2006),
we included the control variable gender with 1 indicating women. In addition, recent
studies argue that an academic scientist’s choice of research project may be influ-
enced by the commercial potential of that project (e.g., Lacetera, 2009). To address
this possibility, we include patenting variables which portray academic scientists’ in-
clination towards commercialization. These variables are commercial patent, which
indicates the average number of patents assigned to non-research institutions and
university patent which indicates the average number of patents assigned to research
institutions. Its calculation is:
average number of commercial patents per year = Cummulative number of commercial patents
Cummulative years since PhD completion
average number of university patents per year = Cummulative number of university patents
Cummulative years since PhD completion
We define ’cumulative number of patents’ in two ways. If the academic scientist
was involved in founding a new technology venture, the cumulative number of patents
is the number of patents accumulated until the year prior to the founding of the new
technology venture. If the academic scientist does not found a new venture, the
cumulative number of patents is the number of patents accumulated until the year
2008. ’Cumulative years since PhD completion’ is computed in a similar way. It is the
number of years elapsed from PhD completion to the year of founding the first new
venture if the academic scientist was also an entrepreneur. It is the number of years
elapsed from PhD completion to the year 2008 if the academic scientist member is not
an entrepreneur. If then the academic scientist has retired and did not found a new
venture, we use 35 years as the cumulative years since PhD completion. Moreover,
we control for the possibility of social influence on the academic scientist’s choice of
research orientation. To take into account such a possibility, we create a variable
dep fresor, which is the average research orientation in the scientist’s department.
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While we concur that scientific prominence reflects a scientist’s scientific ability,
we expect that commercial ability does not necessarily reflect scientific prominence.
This is in line with existing studies arguing that there are different logics to science
and commercialization, respectively (e.g., Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Toole and
Czarnitzki, 2009). Thus, we create the variable commercial ability, which is the
average number of forward citations received by the academic scientist’s patent. The
variable is calculated as follows:
average number of forward citation per year = Total number of forward patent citations
Number of active years
Since research has shown that more recent graduates are more likely to create
new ventures, due to a trend in universities to become more supportive toward com-
mercialization (e.g., Stuart and Ding, 2006), we also controlled for the year of PhD
completion by including variable PhD year. Moreover, to capture a possible im-
printing effect, we indicated whether the academic scientist earned his/her doctorate
degree from a university that embraces technology transfer. Specifically, variable im-
print MIT is 1 if the scientist graduated from MIT and imprint Stanf is 1 if the
scientist graduated from Stanford. We also differentiate between public and private
PhD granting universities. The variable imprint pub is 1 if the scientist graduated
from a public university. In addition, a dummy variable phd non US is 1 if the
scientist graduated from non-US universities.
As extant studies emphasize the influence of social context on a scientist’s decision
in entrepreneurship actions, we include a control variable dep start, which is the
proportion of academic entrepreneurs in the department. In addition, studies point
out that academic scientists respond to incentive (e.g., Lach and Schankerman, 2008).
Accordingly, we collected information on university policy regarding the royalty rate
received by the inventor and include variable royalty. We also include the percentage
of university research funded by industry to capture the possibility that a university
with higher percentage of industry funding may be involved in research projects that
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are closer to practical problems. We collected university funding information from
WEBCASPAR website of the NSF and created the variable ind fund. As university
commitment to technology transfer has been found to influence academic scientists’
involvement in technology transfer, we include variable tto, which is the average
number of technology transfer personnel at the university. This information is based
on AUTM reports.
Since environment resource munificence may influence an academic scientist’s de-
cision to create new technology ventures, we control for venture capitalist activities.
Based on the National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2009, we collected in-
formation on venture capital investments in the states of the five universities in our
sample from 1980 to 2007. We adjusted the investment using yearly the consumer
price index and created variable vc, which represents the average annual venture
capital investment in the university’s state.
3.4 Results
Of the 395 academic scientists in our sample, 26 percent created new ventures, and
their average research orientation leans toward applied or targeted basic research.
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics, while Table 2 shows the regression analysis
results1.
Model 1, serving as the base model, contains the control variables only. Model 2
shows that variable scientific prominence is positive and significant (p<0.001). This
is consistent with proposition 3.2.1, in which academic scientists possessing higher
scientific prominence can be more interested in creating new ventures because they
have a higher expected return of non-academic and knowledge benefits associated
with successful new technology ventures.
1†p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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In proposition 3.2.2.1, we predicted that the relationship between academic sci-
entists’ nature of research and the creation of new technology venture is non-linear
such that the likelihood of creating new ventures increases as the research orientation
increases in its commercial applicability until a cut-off point; after this cut-off point,
the likelihood of creating new ventures decreases as the level commercial applicability
further increases. Model 2 shows that the research orientation variable is positive and
significant (p<0.01)2. In addition, the research orientation square variable is negative
and significant (p<0.05), confirming the non-linear relationship. Plotting the result,
as shown in figure 5, we observe that the cut-off point is approximately at a research
orientation of 0.9. Figure 5 depicts the effect of research orientation on the probabil-
ity of creating new technology ventures while holding other variables at their mean
values.
Figure 5: Probability of starting new ventures by the nature of research for academic
scientists in non-life science
2The author is working on the interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear models as sug-
gested by Hoetker (2007) and Wiersema and Bowen (2009). In addition, Linear Probability Model
of the specification does not change the significance and signs.
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We split the sample into academic scientists who have an average number of publi-
cations below the median (i.e. in the lower 50% of the average number of publications)
and academic scientists who have an average number of publications above the me-
dian (i.e. in the upper 50% of the average number of publications). The resulting
logit regression is depicted in model 3 and model 4, respectively. As shown in model
3, the research orientation variable is positive and significant (p<0.1) while the re-
search orientation square variable is negative and significant (p< 0.05), confirming the
non-linear relation between the research orientation and creation of new technology
ventures. Figure 6 depicts the effect of the research orientation on the probability of
creating new technology ventures while holding other variables at their mean values
for academic scientists whose average publication number is below the median. It
shows that the cut-off point is approximately at a research orientation of 0.6.
Figure 6: Probability of starting new ventures by the nature of research for academic
scientists in non-life science whose average numbers of publications are below the
median
Model 4 shows that the research orientation variable is positive and significant
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(p<0.05). The research orientation square is negative but not significant. Figure 7
depicts the effect of research orientation on the probability of creating new technology
ventures while holding other variables at their means for scientists whose average
publication number is above the median. Taken together, results of model 3 and
model 4 indicate a weak support of proposition 3.2.2.2.
In proposition 3.2.2.3, we predict a decreasing relationship between the level of
commercial applicability and the likelihood that an academic scientist creates a new
venture when the point on the continuum after which a scientist deems an invention
commercially applicable (i.e. is willing to create a new venture) is higher than the
point at which an established firm believes it is commercially applicable (i.e. is willing
to license the invention). Model 2 shows that the coefficient of bio x research orien-
tation is negative and significant (p<0.05). Figure 8 depicts the effect the research
orientation on the probability of creating new technology ventures while holding other
variables at their mean values for academic scientists in the life sciences, confirming
proposition 3.2.2.3.
Our findings also show that a number of control variables were significant pre-
dictors of academic scientists’ entrepreneurial activity. Model 2 shows that the more
recently an academic scientist graduated from his doctoral program, the more likely
that scientist is to engage in new venture formation. This is depicted by the positive
and significant coefficient of PhD year variable (p<0.001). In addition, women aca-
demic scientists are less likely to create new ventures (p<0.05). We also found that
academic scientists who graduated from MIT and Stanford are less likely to create
new ventures (p<0.05). This may indicate that these scientists are more selective
in deciding whether to create new ventures, given their exposure to entrepreneurial
activities during their graduate studies.
Furthermore, those who graduated from public universities are less likely to en-
gage in entrepreneurship than graduates from private universities (p<0.05). This
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Figure 7: Probability of starting new ventures by the nature of research for academic
scientists in non-life science whose average numbers of publications are above the
median
finding is consistent with our interview, which suggested that private universities are
more engaged than public universities in startup activities. Consistent with prior lit-
erature, which emphasized the social effect of entrepreneurial activities, the variable
department startup is positive and significant (p<0.05). In addition, the variable com-
mercial patent and university patent are significant and negative (p<0.05). Moreover,
the variable commercial ability is positive and significant (p<0.001).
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Using an analytical model and empirical evidence, we add to extant understanding
on how academic scientists decide to create new ventures. While focusing on the
creation of new technology ventures, our model considers alternative routes by which
the invention can be commercialized through licensing agreements with established
firms. Our empirical analysis shows that the relationship between academic scientists’
research orientation and their entrepreneurial decision exhibits two types of patterns.
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Figure 8: Probability of starting new ventures by the nature of research for academic
scientists in the life science
When the point on the continuum after which a scientist deems an invention com-
mercially applicable (i.e. is willing to create a new venture) is lower than the point
at which an established firm believes it is commercially applicable (i.e. is willing to
license the invention), we observed an inverted-u shape relationship between the level
of commercial applicability and the likelihood that an academic scientist will create
a new venture. When the point on the continuum after which a scientist deems an
invention commercially applicable is higher than the point at which an established
firm believes it is commercially applicable, we found a decreasing relationship be-
tween level of commercial applicability and the likelihood that an academic scientist
will create a new venture.
Our results also show that scientific prominence positively explains academic sci-
entists’ decision to create new ventures. This finding is consistent with the literature
of university entrepreneurship (e.g., Stuart and Ding, 2006). This study adds to
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the literature of science-driven entrepreneurship by concluding that academic scien-
tists’ nature of research matters in predicting new venture creation. This resonates
with entrepreneurship literature which emphasizes a ‘knowledge corridor’ to recognize
entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane, 2000). However, these results are not without
limitations. For example, entrepreneurship literature has illuminated varying individ-
ual characteristics that explain entrepreneurial entry, such as risk-taking propensities
and a taste for variety. But all of these characteristics are difficult to obtain from
publicly available data. Future research that captures these characteristics in the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TEAM FORMATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY VENTURES
4.1 Introduction
Extant studies that investigate established organizations show that greater uncer-
tainty or complexity in the environment has made difficult for accomplishing one’s
goal alone and has increased the propensity to work in teams (Cannella, Park, and
Lee, 2008). Another apparent situation that encompasses considerable uncertainty
is entrepreneurship. However, scholars who examine entrepreneurship have raised
concerns pertaining to the focus of extant studies (Blatt, 2009; Harper, 2008). Their
concern is that existing studies have emphasized individual entrepreneurs despite the
prevalence of team works in entrepreneurship (Foo, Wong and Ong, 2005; Biais and
Perotti, 2008). The concern is acerbated by studies that show entrepreneurial teams
often perform better than solo entrepreneurs (Roberts, 1991; Chandler and Hanks,
1998). Thus, in this essay, the question of what factors that influence the creation of
entrepreneurial teams is investigated.
There are two major explanations for the formation of entrepreneurial teams.
One explanation is that entrepreneurial teams are created because of resource needs.
According to this explanation, there is a gap between resources required for en-
trepreneurial success and existing resources. This explanation includes social capital,
financial resources, and complementary skills (e.g., Kamm and Nurick, 1993; Ruef,
Aldrich, and Carter, 2003; Stuart and Sorenson, 2007; Astebro and Serrano, 2008;
Foss et al., 2008). Another explanation is that entrepreneurial teams are created
because an individual has inherent desire for social connections. Therefore, people
decide to work in teams with those whom they like, admire, trust, or feel connected
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(i.e., ”chemistry”). This explanation draws considerably from attraction/ similarity
theory (e.g., Francis and Sandberg, 2000; Forbes et al., 2006; Ruef, Aldrich, and
Carter, 2003). In relation to these explanations, this essay focuses on complementary
skill of the resource needs.
Studies that are closest to this essay are Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter (2003) and Aste-
bro and Serrano (2008). Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter (2003) empirically tested social
mechanisms, such as homophily and status, that explain formations of entrepreneurial
teams. Astebro and Serrano (2008) model the formation of entrepreneurial teams as a
problem of financial constraint. Their model takes into account productivity effects of
an entrepreneurial team that originate from social network and complementary skills.
The decisions of the entrepreneur are whether to create a team and the amount
of investment. While explanations of complementary skills are considered in Ruef,
Aldrich, and Carter (2003) as well as in Astebro and Serrano (2008), this essay differs
by including a combination of working solo and working in a team and by introducing
asymmetry of importance between issues in commercialization process.
The next section specifies the basic model of the formation of an entrepreneurial
team. The basic model abstracts from team size. In the third section, the decision
of team size is considered. The fourth section of this chapter discusses the effect of
asymmetry of importance between issues on the creation of entrepreneurial teams.
In the fifth section, the gain from diversity is captured in the model. That is, an
entrepreneurial team is benefited not only from specialization but also from diversity.
4.2 The Base Model
We draw the model from Aghion, Dewantripont and Stein (2008) and Arditti and
Levy (1980). The model depicts the problem of team formation as a trade-off between
increasing probability of success and cooperation cost. An entrepreneur seeks to solve
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the problem in a project that comprises of two stages: Stage 1 and Stage 21. At the
end of Stage 2, an economic value, V , is generated, where V > 0. At each stage,
the project involves two issues: Issue 1, I1, and Issue 2, I2. For example, we can
think of Issue 1 as technology related issues and Issue 2 as market related issues.
In this section, both issues are equally important in every stage of the project. The
entrepreneur obtains an outcome at the end of a stage only if both issues are successful.
Otherwise, the entrepreneur obtains nothing.
At the beginning of each stage, the entrepreneur decides whether to work alone
(i.e., solo-project) or work in a team (i.e., team-project). When a team is employed,
the project entails cooperation cost2, c, where c > 0. For simplicity, we start with a
team of two-people. In other words, if the entrepreneur decides to work in a team,
she adds only one other person into the project. If the entrepreneur works on both
issues, the individual probability of failure on each issue increases because the person’s
attention is divided. We denote q as the probability of failure on an issue when
the person works on both issues, where q ∈ [0, 1). By specializing in one issue, the
individual probability of failure on each issue decreases (Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch,
2006). We denote α as the coefficient of reduction in the probability of failure, where
α ∈ (0, 1). We assume that, in a team-project, individuals specialize. We also assume
that an individual’s chance of success is independent of each other. The decision of
the entrepreneur is depicted in the figure 9.




, is the probability
that both issues are successful multiplied by the final economic value plus the proba-
bility that one of the issues is successful multiplied by zero plus the probability that
both issues are unsuccessful multiplied by zero. The probability of success of an issue
1For simplicity, we define that a project contains two stages. By induction, it is shown the results
do not change if the project comprises of any number of stages.
2We can interpret cooperation cost to include coordination cost, cost of conflict, or the cost of
maintaining a team, such as compensating partners for the opportunity cost of joining the team.
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Figure 9: Decision tree of team formations





= (1− q)2 V (4.2.1)




, is the probability that both issues
are successful multiplied by the final economic value plus the probability that one
of the issues is successful multiplied by zero plus the probability that both issues
are unsuccessful multiplied by zero minus the cooperation cost. Because individuals
specialize when working in a team, the probability of success of an issue in a team-
project is higher than the probability of success in a solo-project. The probability of





= (1− αq)2 V − c (4.2.2)











urally, the entrepreneur will choose the mode of work that delivers the higher expected










= (1− q)2 Π2 (4.2.3)





= (1− αq)2Π2 − c (4.2.4)








(1− αq)2 V − c > (1− q)2 V ⇔
[
(1− αq)2 − (1− q)2
]
V > c
(1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)V > c (4.2.5)








(1− αq)2Π2 − c > (1− q)2Π2 ⇔
[
(1− αq)2 − (1− q)2
]
Π2 > c
(1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)Π2 > c (4.2.6)
The advantage of the team-project over a solo-project is contingent upon the
specialization effect on each issue as well as the complementarity between the two
issues. The entrepreneur favors a team-project if the cooperation cost is less than the
expected return when only one of the issues has higher probability of success or when
both issues have higher probability of success because of specialization.
Proposition 4.2.1 It cannot be value maximizing to have a solo-project operates at
a latter stage than a team-project.
Proof. Available at the appendix
It is possible that the entrepreneur chooses a solo-project at both stages (i.e., SS),
or a team-project at both stages (i.e., TT). She may choose a solo-project at Stage 1
and a team-project at Stage 2. However, she will not choose a team-project at Stage
1 and a solo-project at Stage 2 (i.e., TS). The reason is as follows. The outcome of
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Figure 10: The timing of team formations
Stage 1 is the value of a work in progress while the outcome of Stage 2 is the value of a
completed work. The value of a work in progress is less than the value of a completed
work because the latter contains uncertainty of successful completion while the former
is successfully completed with certainty. Therefore, it is unlikely for a team-project,
which entails cooperation cost, to generate higher pay-off than a solo-project at Stage
1 if, at Stage 2, the marginal benefit of including additional person into the project
does not outweigh the cooperation cost. The result remains even when the probability
of failure, q, is not constant across stages. The underlying intuition is that the value
function is always rising high enough such that it compensates the possible higher
advantage of a team-project to a solo-project at Stage 1 over the advantage of a
solo-project to a team-project in Stage 23.
Proposition 4.2.2
1. Increasing economic value, V , increases the payoff of a team-project to a solo-
project at each stage of development.
3Let q1 and q2 be the individual probability of failure at Stage 1 and at Stage 2, respectively.
Suppose the optimal decision is a team-project at Stage 1 and a solo-project at Stage 2. In
other words, Π2 = (1− q2)2 V , and it must be that (1− α) q2 (2− (1 + α) q2)V < c. For a team-
project to be optimal at Stage 1, it requires (1− α) q1 (2− (1 + α) q1)Π2 > c which is impossi-






2. Decreasing cooperation cost, c, increases the payoff of a team-project to a solo-
project at each stage of development.
3. Increasing probability of failure, q, decreases the payoff of a team-project to a
solo-project at Stage k if q > qk but increases the payoff of a team-project to a

















4. Increasing coefficient of specialization, α, decreases the payoff of a team-project
to a solo-project in each stage of development. It also decreases the cut-off point
of the probability of failure, qk .
Proof. Available at the appendix
The intuitions that underlie the influence of increasing economic value and decreas-
ing cooperation on the advantage of a team-project over a solo-project are straight-
forward. An increase in the cooperation cost makes it harder for a team-project to
outperform a solo-project. In contrast, greater economic value is associated with
higher expected return in each stage. Hence, it is less difficult for a team-project to
outperform a solo-project.
An increase in the probability of failure of an issue does not necessarily enhance
the advantage of a team-project. The reason is that an increase in the probability
of failure gives rise to two counter forces. On the one hand, increasing probability of
failure corresponds to a higher return from specialization. A team-project becomes
more attractive because the higher return from specialization implies greater increase
in the probability of success. On the other hand, increasing probability of failure
implies lower probability that both issues are successful. Given the lowered probability
of successful completion of a stage, a team-project becomes less appealing because a
team-project involves cooperation cost while a solo-project does not.

















When the probability of failure of an issue is low, the former dominates. In
these situations, the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project improves as the
probability of failure an issue increases. When the probability of failure of an issue
is low, the latter dominate. In other words, the advantage of a team-project to a
solo-project diminishes as the probability of failure of an issue increases. In Stage 1
the region where the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project is smaller than
such region in Stage 2 because the outcome at the end of Stage 1, the value of a
work in progress, is smaller than the outcome at the end of Stage 2, the value of a
completed work.
A team-project is preferable to a solo-project when the probability of failure of
an issue is not too low or not too high. When the probability of failure of an issue
is too low, the probability that the entrepreneur solves each issue by herself is high.
In this situation, the return from specialization is low. Given the low return from
specialization, a solo-project is preferable because it does not entail cooperation cost
although the attractiveness of a team-project increases as the probability of failure
rises. When the probability of failure of an issue is too high, the probability that both
issues are successful is too low despite specialization. Therefore, the entrepreneur
favors a solo-project to a team-project.
The larger return from specialization, as indicated by the smaller coefficient of
specialization, improves the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project because the
probability that each issue is successful increases. In addition, the larger return from
specialization enlarges the region where increasing probability of failure improves the
advantage of a team-project to a solo-project. At the same time, it reduces the region
where increasing probability of failure decreases the advantage of a team-project to
a solo-project.
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4.3 Team of n-people
In this section we relax the assumption that a team consists of two people. If the
entrepreneur chooses a team-project, she adds n−1 people into the project and creates
a team of n-people. The reduction in the probability of failure of an issue depends on
the team size. Specifically, the coefficient of specialization, α (n), is decreasing in its
argument and concave where α ∈ (0, 1]. The larger the team size is the better team
members specialize on an issue. The larger team size also demand greater cooperation
cost. That is, the cooperation cost, c (n), is increasing in its argument and convex
where c (n) ≥ 0. When the team size is one (i.e., a solo-project), the coefficient of
specialization is α (1) = 1 and the cooperation cost is c (1) = 0. We begin with the
assumption that both issues are equally important at every stage of the project.
Consider Stage 2, the probability of success of an issue is (1− α (n2) q). The
entrepreneur’s objective function is
max
n2
E (Π2) = (1− α (n2) q)2 V − c (n2) (4.3.1)
The first-order condition is
dE (Π2)
dn2
= −2α′ (n2) qV (1− α (n2) q)− c′ (n2) = 0 (4.3.2)
Let Π∗2 be the highest expected return at Stage 2. Folding back to Stage 1, the
entrepreneur’s objective function is
max
n1
E (Π1) = (1− α (n1) q)2Π∗2 − c (n1) (4.3.3)
The first-order condition is
dE (Π1)
dn1
= −2α′ (n1) qΠ∗2 (1− α (n1) q)− c′ (n1) = 0 (4.3.4)
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When the entrepreneur adds another person into the project, team members can
better specialize, thus increasing the chance of solving each issue. However, a new
member increases the cooperation cost. If the looses from cooperation cost is too high,
the entrepreneur will choose a solo-project. Otherwise, she will increase the team size
until the marginal expected return from larger chance of solving both issues are offset
by the marginal increase in the cooperation cost.
As noted in Proposition 1, it cannot be value maximizing to have a solo-project
operates at a later stage than a team-project. The effect of changes in the economic
value on the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project remains the same. That
is, a greater economic value enhances the advantage of a team-project.
Proposition 4.3.1
1. If a team-project is optimal at both stages, it is not value maximizing to have a
smaller team operate at latter stage than a larger team.
2. An increase in probability of failure, q, decreases the optimal team size at Stage




















Proof. Available at the appendix
As explained in the earlier section, the value of a work in progress is less than
the value of a completed work because the latter contains uncertainty of successful
completion while the former is successfully completed with certainty. Consequently,
it is harder for a team-project to generate pay-off at Stage 1 than at Stage 2. Because
larger team size comes with greater cooperation cost, it is impossible for a larger
team-project to outperform a smaller team-project at Stage 1 if, at Stage 2, the
smaller team-project outperforms the larger team-project.
Similar to situations when an increase in the probability of failure of an issue does
not necessarily enhance the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project, an increase
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in the probability of failure does not always improve the advantage of a larger team-
project to a smaller team-project. That is, greater probability of failure of an issue
does not necessarily result in a larger team-project. As explained earlier, the reason
is that an increase in the probability of failure generates two conflicting forces. On
the one hand, an increase in the probability of failure of an issue suggests a higher
return from specialization. The higher return from specialization makes a larger
team-project attractive because team members can better specialize as the team size
increases. On the other hand, increasing probability of failure suggests that it is more
difficult to complete a stage because completion requires success on both issues. The
lowered probability of completion of a stage reduces the appeals of a larger team size
because the larger team demands greater cooperation cost.
The former dominates when the probability of failure of an issue is low, and the
latter dominates when the probability of failure is high. Accordingly, an increase
in the probability of failure increases the optimal team size when the probability of
failure is not too high. Otherwise, an increase in the probability of failure reduces the
optimal team size. Similar to the earlier section, the region of probability of failure
where it increases the optimal team size is smaller at Stage 1 than at Stage 2 because
it value of work in progress, at the end of Stage 1, is less than the value of a completed
work, at the end of Stage 2.
4.4 Asymmetric Importance between Issues
In this section we relax the assumption that the two issues are equally importance.
For example, technology issue may be to be more important than market issue in
the early stage of the project. At later stage of the project, market issue may be
more important than technology issue. When one issue is more important than the
other, the probability of completing the stage depends on the probability of success
of the more important issue. We use wki as the coefficient of importance of an issue
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where k denotes a stage, k ∈ {1, 2}, i denotes an issue, i ∈ {1, 2}, 0 < wki < 1, and
wk1 + wk2 = 1. The larger wki the less important an issue is relative to the other.
Incorporating the possibility of asymmetric importance between issues at Stage 2,
the probability of success of Issue 1 and Issue 2 at Stage k are (1− qwk1α (nk)) and
(1− qwk2α (nk)). Thus, the entrepreneur’s objective function at Stage 2 is
max
n2
E (Π2) = (1− w21α (n2) q) (1− w22α (n2) q)V − c (n2) (4.4.1)
Consider Stage 1, the entrepreneur’s objective function is5
max
n1
E (Π1) = (1− w11α (n1) q) (1− w12α (n1) q)Π∗2 − c (n1) (4.4.2)
Proposition 4.4.1
1. An increase in probability of failure, q, decreases the optimal team size at Stage k




















2. Increasing coefficient of importance of issue i, wki, increases the cut-off point of
the probability of failure, qk, if wki <
1
2








Proof. Available at the appendix
The intuition that underlies the effect of an increase in the probability of failure
on the advantage of a team-project is the same as before. That is, an increase in
the probability of failure results in two counter forces. On the one hand, increasing
probability of failure corresponds to a higher return from specialization. On the other
hand, increasing probability of failure implies lower probability that both issues are
5When wki =
1
2 , the expected return of a team-project and the expected return of a solo-project
are analogous to the expected return of a team-project and expected return of a solo-project in the
base model.
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successful. Therefore, an increase in the probability of failure of an issue does not
always improve the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project. Similar intuition
applies on the optimal team size. That is, a greater probability of failure of an
issue increases the optimal team size when the probability of failure is not too high.
At the border between the region where greater probability of failure enhances the
advantage of a team-project and the region where greater probability of failure lessens
the advantage of a team-project is a cut-off point. The cut-off point is the level of
probability of failure where the two counter forces are equal.
The effect of a decrease in the importance of an issue on the region where greater
probability of failure enhances the advantage of a team-project to a solo-project is
contingent upon whether the issue is the more important. If the issue is the more
important of the two, a decrease in the importance reduces the region where greater
probability of failure enhances the advantage of a team-project. If the issue is the less
important of the two, a decrease in the importance expands the region where greater
probability of failure enhances the advantage of a team-project.
The reason is as follows. A decrease in the importance of an issue implies an
increase of importance of the other issue. Consequently, the success of the other issue
becomes more crucial and the success of the focal issue becomes less crucial for the
completion of the stage. If the issue is the less important of the two, an increase in
the importance reduces the asymmetry of importance between issues. In contrast, the
asymmetry of importance between issues is widened by an increase in the importance
of an issue if the issue is the more crucial of the two. Regardless the asymmetry,
completion of a stage requires that both issues are successful. When the asymmetry
is large, the less important issue becomes a costly necessity in a team-project because
specialization on the less critical issue nevertheless involves expense in cooperation.
Therefore, an increase in asymmetry reduces the advantage of a team-project to a
solo-project. The region where greater probability of failure enhances the advantage
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of a team-project is at its greatest extent when the issues are equally important.
Similar intuition applies on the optimal team size. If the issue is the more im-
portant of the two, a decrease of importance reduces the asymmetry of importance
between issues. In contrast, if the issue is the less crucial of the two, a decrease
of importance enlarges the asymmetry of importance between issues. Because of the
asymmetry, the less important issue becomes a costly necessity for completing a stage.
Greater team size exacerbates the problem because it involves larger cooperation cost.
Consequently, an increase in asymmetry reduces the attractiveness of a larger team-
project to a smaller team-project. As in the earlier section, the implication is that
the region where greater probability of failure increases the optimal team size is at
its greatest extent when both issues are equally important.
4.5 Specialization and Diversity
In this section, we consider diversity as one of the benefits from working in a team.
Building on literature that argues team diversity enhances the quality of solution (e.g.,
Milliken and Martins, 1996; Cannella, Park, and Lee, 2008), we specify the economic
value of the project as a function of diversity. Because increasing team size allows
greater diversity, we capture the effect of diversity on economic value through team
size. That is, V (n) = A+k(n) where A is the initial value without diversity and k(n)
is the additional economic value because diversity enhances the quality of solution.
The additional economic value, k(n), is increasing in its argument and concave. For
simplicity, we assume that there is only one stage of development and that both issues
are equally important.
The entrepreneur objective function is
max
n
E (Π) = (1− α (n) q)2 V (n)− c (n) (4.5.1)




= −2α′ (n) qV (n) (1− α (n) q) + (1− α (n) q)2 V ′ (n)− c′ (n) = 0 (4.5.2)
Team size influences the expected return from the project in two ways: special-
ization and diversity. First, increasing team size allows team members to better
specialize. The greater return from specialization is reflected in the smaller prob-
ability of failure of an issue. It follows that the probability of a successful project
increases. The reason is that the reduction of the probability of failure of an issue
is accompanied by a reduction of the probability of failure of the other issue. Sec-
ond, increasing team size allows diversity that improves the final economic value of
the project. Therefore, it improves the expected return of a project. Specialization
increases the chance of obtaining the larger economic value resulting from diversity.
However, a new member increases the cooperation cost. If the looses from cooper-
ation is too high, the entrepreneur will choose a solo-project. Otherwise, she will
increase the team size until the marginal expected return from the larger chance of
solving issues and from the larger economic value is offset by the marginal loss due
to the cooperation cost.
Proposition 4.5.1
1. An increase in the initial value of the project increases team size and team
diversity.
2. If α′ (n∗) < ᾱ, an increase in the probability of failure decreases team size and
team diversity if q < q̄ . Otherwise, an increase in the probability of failure can
increases or decreases team size and team diversity. If α′ (n∗) > ᾱ, an increase
in the probability of failure increases team size and team diversity if q < q̄ .
Otherwise, an increase in the probability of failure can increases or decreases
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team size and team diversity, where6 q̄ = αV
′+α′V
α(αV ′+2α′V )
and ᾱ = −αV ′
2V
.
Proof. Available at the appendix
Larger initial value of the project is associated with a greater optimal team size.
The intuition is straight forward. Greater initial value is associated with a larger
expected return. Therefore, it enables the entrepreneur to tolerate additional cooper-
ation cost resulting from a larger team. At the same time, it enables the entrepreneur
to benefit from more specialization and greater diversity from a larger team.
The influence of initial probability of failure (i.e., the probability of failure without
specialization) on specialization is as follows. An increase in the initial probability
of failure of an issue gives rise to two forces. On one hand, the return from special-
ization is larger. This force is in favor of increasing team size. On the other hand,
the probability of a successful project declines. This force is against adding more
members. The influence of initial probability of failure on diversity is as follows. An
increase in the initial probability of failure gives rise to two counter forces. On one
hand, at a given level of specialization, increasing initial probability of failure reduces
the chance of successfully solve an issue. This force works against increasing team
size. On the other hand, the probability that both issues are successful will increase.
This force works in favor of increasing team size.
In order to see the mechanism of the second force, we first note that the probability
that both issues are successful becomes smaller the larger the chance that one issue
is successful while the other issue fails. The probability that one issue is successful
but the other issue fails declines the larger the probability that both issues fail. In
other words, there are two effects of the probability that both issues fail on the
probability that both issues are successful. First is the negative direct effect. Second,
it is the positive indirect effect though the reduction in the chance that one issue is
6For clarity, we suppress the notations. Hence, we wrote α (n∗), α′ (n∗), V (n∗), and V ′ (n∗) as
α, α′, V , and V ′.
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successful but the other issue fails. Because the latter always dominates the former
the probability that both issues fail increases the probability that both issues are
successful.
Changes in the initial probability of failure affect the optimal team size through
specialization and diversity. As explained earlier, an increase in the initial probability
of failure enhances the return from specialization. It was also described that, for a
given level of specialization, an increase in the initial probability of failure reduces
the chance to successfully solve an issue. Hence, it lowers the chance to benefit from
diversity. If the former dominates, greater initial probability of failure increases the
optimal team size when the probability of failure is not too high. However, it reduces
the optimal team size when the probability of failure is high enough.
An opposite pattern is obtained if the latter force dominates. That is, greater
initial probability of failure reduces the optimal team size when the initial probability
of failure is not too high. Otherwise, it increases the optimal team size. The first
pattern occurs when adding a new member into the project substantially reduces the
probability of failure. Meanwhile, the second pattern occurs when the probability of
failure does not decline substantially when a new member is included in the project.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This essay explains the mechanisms that give rise to entrepreneurial team and its
structure. It focuses on two dimensions of team structure: size and diversity. These
dimensions have been deemed as important in explaining performance differential
among entrepreneurial teams (Taylor and Greve, 2006; Beckman, Burton, and O’Reilly,
2007; Dencker, Gruber, and Shah, 2009). The model and results in this essay are lim-
ited in several ways. First, it abstracts from the possibility of turnover. While the
model explains the optimal team size, it is silent on the continuation or the discontin-
uation of persons who join the team. Second, it is limited in capturing the uncertainty
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involved in entrepreneurship. Third, it abstracts from psychological reasons of creat-
ing entrepreneurial teams.
Despite the limitations, the model advances our understanding on entrepreneurial
teams in new technology ventures by contributing to the entrepreneurship literature
and to the team literature. It contributes to the entrepreneurship literature in three
ways. First, it complements Astebro and Serrano (2008) in adding theoretical foun-
dations on entrepreneurial teams. Second, it extends our knowledge on the effect of
uncertainty on formations of entrepreneurial teams. While consistent with the cur-
rent understanding that greater uncertainty increases the propensity of team work,
this essay shows that an entrepreneur is better-off by working alone than working in a
team if the uncertainty is too high. Third, the essay introduces the asymmetry of im-
portance into the discussion of entrepreneurial teams. It shows that entrepreneurial
teams are more likely to be created the more balanced the issues are.
The essay contributes to the team literature by investigating the relation between
specialization and diversity. Most studies on team have examined specialization and
diversity as two independent choices. However, in practice, these choices are inter-
twined. This essay complements Hong and Page (2004) that explains the connections
between teams size and team diversity. Future research opportunities include em-
pirical estimations of the predictions in this essay. Another interesting investigation
would be to understand the relation between resource needs and psychological needs




A.1 Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. The slope of the government agency’s best reply is











[Ug (Rgs)− Ug (Rgf )] − V ′′ (G) < 0. Therefore, −∂Ĝ/∂Fa∂Ĝ/∂G < 0.
The slope of the firm’s best reply is F̂ ′a (G) = −
∂F̂a(G)/∂G
∂F̂a(G)/∂Fa
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be a negative definite symmetrix matrix. For its two principal minors to alternate
in sign, it must be that ∂
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< 0 which contradicts the condition
for a strict local maximum. If Mj > M̄j,
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A.2 Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1. For the scientist to create a new venture, p(q)B +












. The sign of ∂B̄
∂q
depends on the sign of r′ (q) p (q)− p′ (q) r (q).
For ∂B̄
∂q














Proof of Proposition 3.2.2. Based on equation (3.2.1), the academic scientist





= as. Furthermore, the university will only consider licensing to an established firm
if pF (a) ≥ VF (a)R . Otherwise, the university will not search for a potential licensee.
Since pF (af ) =
VF (af)
R
, the university will search if a > af . First, consider the case of
af ≤ as. When a < af , at information set S.1 and S.2, the scientist does not create
new ventures. At information set U.2, the university will not search for firm a licensee
because a < af .Since at S.2 the scientist does not create a new venture, at U.1 the
university shelves. When af < a < as, at information set S.1 and S.2, the scientist
does not create a new venture. At information set U.2, the university searches for a
firm licensee. At U.1, the university does not shelve the invention. When af < as < a,
at S.1 and S.2, the scientist creates a new venture. Creating new ventures is increasing
in a since the right hand side of p (q) (B + aK) > r (q)K is increasing in a. However,
whether the scientist can create the venture depends on the university’s decision at
U.2 and U.1. At U.2, the university supports the scientist’s venture if EUUs ≥ EUUl
⇔ p (q)BU +LVUs ≥ pF (a)BU +LVUl ⇔ [p (q)− pF (a)]BU > VUs − VUl. Increasing
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a, decreases the left hand side of the equation. Hence, it becomes less likely that
the university decides to support scientist entrepreneurs and more likely that the
university licenses the invention to an established firm. At information set U.1, the
university does not shelve. Next we consider the case of af > as. When a < as, at
information set S.1 and S.2, the scientist does not create new ventures. At information
set U.2, the university will not search for a firm licensee because a < af .Since at
S.2 the scientist does not create a new venture, at U.1 the university shelves.When
a < as < af , at S.1 and S.2, the scientist creates a new venture. Creating new
ventures is increasing in a since the right hand side of p (q) (B + aK) > r (q)K is
increasing in a. At U.2, the university does not search for a licensee because a < af ,
hence it offers the scientist the opportunity to create a new venture. At U.1, the
university shelves the invention if p (q) < VUs−L
BU
. At S.1, the scientist creates a new
venture from the shelved invention.When as < af < a, at S.1 and S.2, the scientist
creates a new venture. Creating new ventures is increasing in variable a. Again,
whether the scientist can create the venture depends on the university’s decision
at U.2 and U.1. At U.2, the university supports the scientist’ venture if EUUs ≥
EUUl ⇔ p (q)BU + LVUs ≥ pF (a)BU + LVUl ⇔ [p (q)− pF (a)]BU > VUs − VUl.
Increasing a, decreases the left hand side of the equation. Hence, it becomes less
likely that the university decides to support scientist entrepreneurs and more likely
that the university licenses the invention to an established firm. At information set
U.1, the university does not shelve.To see the existence of a cut-off point ā, recall





such that p (q) < pF (a) when
max(a). This implies that there exists a point where p (q) = pF (a) before which
p (q) > pF (a) such that [p (q)− pF (a)]BU > VUs − VUl. The cut-off point is ā where


















A.3 Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1. Since Π2 < V , then (1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)Π2 <
(1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)V . If (1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)Π2 > c, it must also be that
(1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)V > c. In other words, if a team-project is value maximizing
at Stage 1, it is also value maximizing at Stage 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2.2. Let ∆k be the advantage of a team-project to
a solo-project at Stage k, k ∈ {1, 2}. ∆2 = (1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q)V − c and
























= 2 (1− α) (1− (1 + α) q)Π2 + q (1− α)
((1− αq) + (1− q))Π′2 where Π′2 = ∂Π2∂q . When q <
1
(1+α)
, we get ∂∆1
∂q
> 0 when















= −2q (1− αq)V < 0 and ∂∆2
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=
−2q (1− αq)Π2 + (1− α) q (2− (1 + α) q) ∂Π2∂α < 0.
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) < 0 because ∂Π2∂α < 0 and
∂Π2
∂q











)2 . Furthermore, ∂2Π2∂q∂α < 0 when q < 1(1+α)
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1.1. Let n∗2 and n
∗
1be the team size such that
−2α′ (n∗2) qV (1− α (n∗2) q)−c′ (n∗2) = 0 and −2α′ (n∗1) qΠ∗2 (1− α (n∗1) q)−c′ (n∗1) =
0 respectively. In addition, let nL be the larger team size and nS be the smaller
team size, nL > nS. Suppose that n
∗
2 = nS and n
∗





must be that E (Π2 (nS)) > E (Π2 (nL)) and E (Π1 (nL)) > E (Π2 (nS)). That is,
(α (nS)− α (nL)) q (1− (α (nS) + α (nL)) q)V < c (nL)− c (nS) and
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(α (nS)− α (nL)) q (1− (α (nS) + α (nL)) q)Π∗2 > c (nL)− c (nS) which is impossi-
ble because Π∗2 < V
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1.2. Let Gk be the first-order condition at Stage









k < 0 by











2, ∂G2/∂q = (−2α′ (n∗2)V ) (1− 2α (n∗2) q). Hence, ∂G2/∂q > 0 if q < 12α(n∗2)
and
∂G2/∂q > 0 if q >
1
2α(n∗2)
. Consider Stage 1,
∂G1/∂q = (−2α′ (n∗1)Π∗2) (1− 2α (n∗1) q) + (−2α′ (n∗1) q) (1− α (n∗1) q) (∂Π∗2/∂q).















and ∂G1/∂q < 0
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where Gk is the first-order condition at Stage k. Consider Stage 2, ∂G2/∂q =
(−α′ (n∗2)V ) (1− 4w21w22α (n∗2) q). Thus, ∂G2/∂q > 0 if q < 14w21w22α(n∗2)
and ∂G2/∂q >
0 if q > 1
4w21w22α(n∗2)
. Consider Stage 1, ∂G1/∂q = −α′ (n∗1)Π∗2 (1− 4w11w12α (n∗1) q)+
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. Solving for ∂q1
∂w11
= 0, we get w11 =
1
2
. If tollows that
∂q1
∂w11





< 0 if w11 >
1
2
Proof of Proposition 4.5.1. Let F be the first-order condition. Using stan-





for j = A, q where ∂F/∂n∗ < 0 by the










. Consider j = A, ∂F
∂A
=
−2α′ (n) q ∂V
∂A
(1− α (n) q) > 0. Next, consider j = q, ∂F
∂q
= −2α′ (n)V (n) (1− 2α (n) q)−
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2α (n) (1− α (n) q)V ′ (n). Solving for ∂F
∂q











> 0 when −αV ′
2V
< α′ (n). Let q̄ =
αV ′+α′V
α(αV ′+2α′V )
and ᾱ = −αV ′
2V
. It follows that ∂F
∂q
> 0 when α′ (n) < ᾱ and q < q̄, or
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